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I. THE AUTOMATIC STAY GENERALLY AND THE PARTIES IT PROTECTS
1.000 GENERALLY
mmediately upon the filing of a voluntary petition under the Bank-
ruptcy Code a stay arises which generally bars all debt collection
efforts against the debtor or property of his bankruptcy estate although
the collection of postpetition debts against the debtor is not stayed.1 The
court need not sign any order to give rise to the stay; the mere filing of the
petition, with supporting documentation, with the clerk is sufficient.
2
2.000 PURPOSE OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY
The automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections
afforded by the Bankruptcy Code. It gives the debtor a breathing spell
from his creditors and it also stops all collection efforts, all harassment
and all foreclosure actions. It gives the debtor time to file a plan of
reorganization, or simply relieves him of the financial pressures that
drove him into bankruptcy. 3
* The author was law clerk to the Hon. Emil F. Goldhaber of the Bankruptcy Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania from 1983 until 1986. He was previously law clerk to
the Hon. Thomas C. Gibbons of the Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Pennsyl-
vania at Wikes-Barre from 1982 until 1983; he formerly occupied that same position
with the Hon. Thomas Wood of the Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Pennsyl-
vania at Harrisburg from 1981 until 1982.
The author is currently employed at a firm which accepts a substantial number of cases
in bankruptcy: Adelman, Lavine, Krasny, Gold & Levin, 1900 Two Penn Center, Philadel-
phia, PA 19102 (215) 568-7515.
11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1978 & Supp. 1985).
2 In Re Artishon, 39 Bankr. 890, 893 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984); Jones v. Wood (In Re
Wood), 33 Bankr. 320, 321 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1983).
3 S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 54-55 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code
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At least two goals are implemented by the stay. First, the stay prevents
the diminution or dissipation of the assets of the estate during the
pendency of the bankruptcy case.4 Second, it enables the debtor to avoid
the multiplicity of claims arising against him in different forums.5 The
stay is intended to prevent a chaotic and uncontrolled scramble for the
debtor's assets in a variety of uncoordinated proceedings in different
courts. The stay insures that the debtor's affairs will be initially central-
ized in a single forum in order to prevent conflicting judgments from
different courts and to harmonize the interests of all creditors. 6
3.000 STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
Under § 362(a), eight subsections indicate what types of conduct are
barred by the automatic stay. Exceptions to the stay are specified by the
eleven subsections of § 362(b). The reputation of the pervasiveness of §
362(a) among legal practitioners and members of the bench has done
much to add a certain judicial gloss to the expansiveness afforded that
provision in some of the cases under which it is construed, and thus the
breadth of the automatic stay may extend beyond the literal language of
the statute.7
Several distinctions may be observed in understanding § 362(a). The
first is that that provision speaks of actions against the debtor and
actions against the debtor's estate.8 An additional distinction based on
the concept of property of the estate, as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 541(a), and
implicitly recognized in § 362(a), is that property of the debtor, as opposed
to property of the estate, is not protected by the automatic stay against the
collection of debts that arose after the filing of the petition. Thus, in
determining whether the automatic stay is applicable, it must be deter-
mined whether the creditor's action is against: 1) the debtor; 2) property
of the estate; or 3) property of the debtor.9 The second distinction is that
§ 362(a) speaks of debts that arose prior to the commencement of the
bankruptcy proceeding, as opposed to debts which arose thereafter. This
is one expression of the philosophy of the Bankruptcy Code that the filing
of the petition is an important cleavage date in separating those matters
Cong. & Ad. News 5787, 5840-41.
4 In Re Towner Petroleum Co., 48 Bankr. 182, 185 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1985).
5 Id.
6 Fidelity Mortgage Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47, 55 (2d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093 (1977).
7 See, e.g., Ellison v. Northwest Engineering Co., 707 F.2d 1310, 1311 (11th Cir.
1983)(although the literal terms of § 362(a) do not so provide, courts are also "bound by the
automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1)"). ,
' Mason v. Williams (In Re Mason), 45 Bankr. 498, 499-500 (Bankr. D. Ore. 1984);
Wymouth v. York (In Re York), 13 Bankr. 757 (Bankr. D. Me. 1981).
9 Nevada National Bank v. Casgul of Nevada, Inc. (In Re Casgul of Nevada, Inc.), 22
Bankr. 65, 66 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982).
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that should affect the bankruptcy proceeding and those that should not.
Thus, a creditor who is owed a debt by a chapter 7 debtor that arose after
the filing of the petition may generally proceed against the debtor or
against property not belonging to the estate.
4.000 BANKRUPTCY AMENDMENTS AND FEDERAL JUDGESHIP ACT OF 1984
Several changes were wrought in the provisions on the automatic stay
by the passage of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984 ("the 1984 Act"), Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (July 10,
1984). Generally, the changes effected under § 362, as well as those under
the other sections of title 11 of the United States Code, are effective as to
cases filed 90 or more days after the enactment date of July 10,1984.
Thus, questions on the scope of the automatic stay in a particular case
must be resolved with an eye toward the filing date of the petition. Except
as otherwise noted, all discussion of the stay in this work presupposes the
applicability of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act
of 1984.
5.000 SCOPE OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY
5.100 Scope of the Automatic Stay as to the Debtor
As a general matter the automatic stay does not bar the debtor from
performing any action.10 The case law has carved a few exceptions to this
rule."
5.200 Scope of the Automatic Stay as to Codebtors in Chapter 13
Proceedings
The automatic stay of § 362(a) does not extend to protect those
individuals who are jointly liable on debts with a debtor in a chapter 7 or
11 case. Hence, on the filing of a debtor's petition under either of those
two chapters, the debtor's sureties and guarantors would remain subject
to creditor action notwithstanding § 362(a). An exception to this rule is
provided for cases pending in chapter 13 through 11 U.S.C. § 1301 which
states as follows:
§ 1301. Stay of action against codebtor (a) Except as provided in
subsections (b) and (c) of this section, after the order for relief
under this chapter, a creditor may not act, or commence or
1o Assoc. of St. Croix Condominium Owners v. St. Croix Hotel Corp., 682 F.2d 446,448 (3d
Cir. 1982); In Re Augustus Court Assoc., 43 Bankr. 352, 353 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984); Ideal
Roofing & Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. M. R. Harrison Constr. Corp. (In Re Ideal Roofing &
Sheet Metal Works, Inc.), 9 Bankr. 2, 3 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980).
" 11 U.S.C. § 1301. (See also the discussion on requesting relief from the automatic stay
of § 362(a) infra text accompanying notes 115-120).
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continue any civil action, to collect all or any part of a consumer
debt of the debtor from any individual that is liable on such debt
with the debtor, or that secured such debt, unless-
(1) such individual became liable on or secured such debt in the
ordinary course of such individual's business; or
(2) the case is closed, dismissed, or converted to a case under
chapter 7 or 11 of this title.
(b) A creditor may present a negotiable instrument, and may give
notice of dishonor of such an instrument.
(c) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a
hearing, the court shall grant relief from the stay provided by
subsection (a) of this section with respect to a creditor, to the
extent that-
(1) as between the debtor and the individual protected under
subsection (a) of this section, such individual received the consid-
eration for the claim held by such creditor;
(2) the plan filed by the debtor proposes not to pay such claim;
or
(3) such creditor's interest would be irreparably harmed by
continuation of such stay.
(d) Twenty days after the filing of a request under subsection
(c)(2) of this section for relief from the stay provided by subsection
(a) of this section, such stay is terminated with respect to the
party in interests making such request, unless the debtor or any
individual that is liable on such debt with the debtor files and
serves upon such party in interest a written objection to the
taking of the proposed action.
5.300 The Applicability of the Automatic Stay in Favor of the Debtor's
Co-Defendants
Where the debtor is one of several defendants in a civil action
commenced prior to the filing of the petition, the automatic stay, of
course, would generally bar all further action in the suit against the
debtor for prepetition debts in the absence of relief from the automatic
stay. 12 The stay would not bar the continuation of the litigation against
the other defendants.13 In the absence of relief from the stay the plaintiff
in a civil action may still advance the litigation against the other
defendants while (1) holding the matter in abeyance as to the debtor or (2)
seeking, and ultimately obtaining, the debtor's dismissal from the suit. A
12 Section 362(a)(1); but see § 362(b)(4)-(5).
13 Pitts v. Unarco Ind., Inc., 698 F.2d 113 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 509 (1983);
Lynch v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 710 F.2d 1194 (6th Cir. 1983); Williford v. Armstrong
World Indus. Inc., 715 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1983).
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decision to stay a suit against a non-debtor co-defendant is one that is
predicated on federal law.14
5.400 The Applicability of the Automatic Stay in Favor of the Debtor's
Principles
The automatic stay does not protect the principals, such as the directors
and officers, of a debtor entity.15 If the real objective of the litigation is
the debtor rather than the principals or if the continuation of the action
would burden the estate16 and frustrate reorganization through diversion
of corporate manpower into the defense of individual suits, the court may
bar the continuation of the action under 11 U.S.C. § 105.
5.500 Summary of Actions Barred by the Automatic Stay
The protection of the automatic stay is quite broad. It bars, prima facie,
the following types of conduct: the commencement or continuation of
judicial or administrative process against the debtor that was or could
have been commenced against the debtor prior to the filing of the
petition;' 7 the enforcement against the debtor or against property of the
estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case; 18 an
act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the
estate or to exercise control over property of the estate; 19 any act to
create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate;20 any
act to create, perfect or enforce against property of the debtor any lien to
the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the commence-
ment of the bankruptcy case;2' any act to collect, assess or recover a claim
against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the bank-
ruptcy case; 22 the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before
,4 Herron v. Keene Corp., 751 F.2d 873, 874-75 (6th Cir. 1985).
15 In Re Anje Jewelry Co., Inc. 47 Bankr. 485 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1983)(suit not barred
against principals of a debtor corporation even though action was also against the debtor
corporation although the corporation was a co-defendant); In Re Trails End Lodge, Inc., 45
Bankr. 597 (Bankr. D. Ver. 1984); Nevada National Bank v. Casgul of Nevada, Inc. (In Re
Casgul of Nevada, Inc.), 22 Bankr. 65 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982)(appellate court held that
bankruptcy court, in concluding that relief from the stay was obligatory as to a secured
creditor, erred by mandating that the creditor proceed against the debtor's collateral before
recourse against collateral pledged by the debtor's principals).
16 Jones-Manville Corp. v. Asbestos Litigation Group (In Re Jones-Manville Corp.), 40
Bankr. 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
17 Section 362(a)(1).
'8 Section 362(a)(2).
'9 Section 362(a)(3).
20 Section 362(a)(4).
21 Section 362(a)(5).
22 Section 362(a)(6).
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the commencement of the case under the Bankruptcy Code;23 and the
commencement or continuation of a proceeding in the United States Tax
Court "concerning" the debtor.24
5.600 Summary of Actions Not Barred by the Automatic Stay
The filing of a petition does not operate as a stay: of the commencement
or continuation of criminal action against the debtor;25 of the collection of
alimony, maintenance or support from property that is not property of the
estate;26 of any act to perfect an interest in property to the extent that the
trustee's rights and powers are subject to such perfection under 11 U.S.C.
§ 546(b) or to the extent that such act is accomplished within the period
provided under 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(A) for the perfection of a security
interest within the allowable ten day period;27 under § 362(a)(1), of the
commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a govern-
mental unit to enforce such unit's police or regulatory power;28 under §
362(a)(2), of the enforcement of a judgment, other than a money judg-
ment, obtained in an action or proceeding by a government unit to enforce
its police or regulatory power; 29 certain setoffs by a commodity broker,
forward contract merchant, stockbroker etc.;30 of the setoff by a repo
participant under certain situations;31 of the commencement of an action
by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to foreclose a
mortgage or deed of trust in any case in which the mortgage or deed of
trust held by the Secretary is insured or was formerly insured under the
National Housing Act and covers property, or combinations of property,
consisting of five or more living units;32 the issuance to the debtor by a
governmental unit of a notice of a tax deficiency notice; 33 any act of a
lessor to the debtor under a lease of nonresidential real property that has
terminated by the expiration of the stated term of the lease before the
commencement of or during a case under title 11 to obtain possession of
such property;34 and of the presentment of a negotiable instrument and
the giving of notice of and protesting dishonor of such an instrument.3
23 Section 362(a)(7).
24 Section 362(a)(8).
25 Section 362(b)(1).
26 Section 362(b)(2).
27 Section 362(b)(3).
21 Section 362(b)(4).
' Section 362(b)(5).
30 Section 362(b)(6).
31 Section 362(b)(7).
32 Section 362(b)(8).
a Section 362(b)(9).
a Section 362(b)(10).
3 Section 362(b)(11).
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5.700 Actions Barred by the Automatic Stay
5.710 Subsection 362(a)(1) bars:
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or
employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other
action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have
been commenced before the commencement of the case under this
title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title 11[] 36
Generally all debt collection efforts against the debtor on prepetition
debts and all legal process against the debtor are stayed under this
provision if such process was, or could have been, commenced prior to the
filing of the petition. Also noteworthy is that this aspect of the stay only
bars litigation against the debtor. Litigation or debt collection against the
debtor on postpetition claims is not barred by § 362(a)(1). As we discussed
previously, under § 322(a)(1) litigation against co-debtors, co-defendants,
or principals of a debtor is not barred.
The filing of counterclaims against the debtor by an entity is a
violation of the automatic stay if the filing of that counterclaim against
the debtor would be violative as an independent suit.37 Nonetheless, a
bankruptcy court's denial of a defendant's motion for relief from the
automatic stay in order to interpose a counterclaim may constitute an
abuse of discretion since the "policy of the Bankruptcy statute is to
allow ... counterclaims.
' 38
As is no surprise, belligerent demands for payment of a prepetition debt
is a violation of the stay.39
Notwithstanding the literal terms of § 362(a), a labor strike to collect
on a prepetition debt does not violate the automatic stay in light of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101 - 115. 40
. Where the debtor, who had filed a third party complaint against a
previously unjoined entity, was a defendant in a civil action in federal
district court the court held that the stay did not bar the postpetition
entry of summary judgment in favor of the third party defendant and
against the debtor. In this case judicial action was essentially nothing
36 Section 362(a)(1).
"7 Ideal Roofing & Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. M. R. Harrison Const. Corp. (In Re Ideal
Roofing & Sheet Metal Works, Inc.), 9 Bankr. 2, 3 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980).
" Bohack Corp. v. Borden, Inc. 599 F.2d 1160, 1168 (2d Cir. 1979)(decided under the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898).
" Underwood v. DeLay (In Re DeLay), 48 Bankr. 282 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1984).
41 Crowe & Assoc., Inc. v. Bricklayers and Masons Union Local No. 2 of Detroit,
Michigan, 713 F.2d 211 (6th Cir. 1983); Petrusch v. Teamsters Local 317, Syracuse, N.Y.,
667 F.2d 297 (2d Cir. 1981).
19861
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more than a dismissal with prejudice of the third party complaint; no
other relief was apparently entered in favor of the third party.41
A questionable decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that where A. filed a postpetition suit against B., to which B.
filed a postpetition complaint against the debtor for indemnity and
contribution, the stay of § 362(a)(1) did not bar the filing of the third
party complaint against the debtor although all the operative facts giving
rise to the suit arose prepetition. 42 The court predicated the result on a
state court procedural rule which barred the filing of an action for
indemnity and contribution until after suit had been commenced against
the third party plaintiff, in this case B. Since the third party complaint
could not have been lodged prior to the filing of the petition in the absence
of the filing of A.'s suit, the court held that the action was not barred by
the automatic stay. In the face of the breadth of the definition of a "claim"
in 11 U.S.C. § 101(4), which provides a federal rule of decision for the
case, one is left to wonder why the court preferred instead to apply a state
court procedural rule as a rule of decision notwithstanding Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64.
5.720 Subsection 362(a)(2)
Under § 362(a)(2) the stay bars:
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the
estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the
case under this title[.]43
Accorded protection under this subsection are the debtor and property of
the estate. Property of the estate is defined at 11 U.S.C. § 541(a). Section
§ 362(a)(2) does not expressly bar the enforcement of judgments against
"property of the debtor," such relief being accorded under § 362(a)(5).
The enforcement of a judgment obtained after the filing of the petition
would not be barred by § 362(a)(2), but § 362(a)(1) would prohibit a party
from seeking or obtaining such a judgment unless the intended judgment
was on a postpetition debt. Section 362(b)(5) also exempts from the stay
the enforcement of judgments held by a governmental unit to enforce its
police or regulatory power.
5.730 Subsection 362(a)(3)
The third subsection of § 362(a) bars:
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of
'1 Jefferson Ward Stores, Inc. v. Doody Co., 48 Bankr. 276 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985).
42 Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co., Inc. (In Re M. Frenville Co., Inc.), 744 F.2d 332
(3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 911 (1985).
11 Section 362(a)(2).
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property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the
estate[.]44
The provision enjoins the taking of property of the estate and property
from the estate. The clause barring acts against property "from" the
estate apparently prohibits an entity from attempting to possess property
in the possession of the estate or on property of the estate but which is not
property of the estate. The mere possessory interest is protected. Thus, §
362(a)(3) would bar a landlord from dispossessing a debtor/lessee from a
leasehold after the filing of the petition even though the debtor's default
under the lease might provide for that recourse. 45 However, § 362(b)(10)
exempts from the stay acts by a landlord against a nonresidential real
property lease which has terminated before the commencement of a case
or during its pendency according to the terms of the lease. For a possible
exception to § 362(b)(10) see 11 U.S.C. § 108(b) which is discussed below.
The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984
added the final clause of § 362(a)(3) to protect against the "exercise [of]
control over property of the estate." This provision was apparently added
to "overrule" cases such as those holding that the stay was not violated by
a bank's exercise of dominion over estate funds on deposit with the bank
by the bank's freezing of the account. Prior to the passage of this clause,
the bankruptcy courts were split over whether actions such as these were
a violation of the stay.
46
This new clause appears to mandate that a creditor holding any
property of the estate turn it over to the debtor, or suffer the risk of a
finding of contempt for violating § 362(a)(3). Yet the apparent turnover
requirement under § 362(a)(3) is at odds with the more explicit language
of 11 U.S.C. § 542 which imposes several conditions on turnover.
Presumably the case law will reconcile the schism.
In a case where an insurer sought to cancel an insurance policy under
a "cancelable at will" clause after the debtor filed for bankruptcy, the
court found that the filing of the petition was the sole basis for such
action. The court held that the policy was property of the estate, and the
insurer's action was violative of §§ 362(a)(3) and 363(e) which allows the
trustee or debtor in possession to use, sell or lease property of the estate
notwithstanding any provision in a lease, contract or applicable law that
4 Section 362(a)(3).
4 In Re Law Clinic of Mott & Gray, P.C., 39 Bankr. 73, 74 n.3 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984);
Roslyn Savings Bank v. Comcoach Corp. (In Re Comcoach Corp.), 19 Bankr. 231 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1982), affd, 698 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1983).
" See, e.g., Georgia Federal Bank, FSB v. Owens-Peterson (In Re Owens-Peterson), 39
Bankr. 186 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1984)(no violation); Bank of America National Trust and
Savings Assoc. v. Edgins (In Re Edgins), 36 Bankr. 480, 484 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1984)(no
violation); Cusanno v. Fidelity Bank, 29 Bankr. 810 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983)(violation),
vacated and remanded without published opinion, 734 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1984).
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is conditioned on, inter alia, the filing of bankruptcy. The court enjoined
the cancellation. 47
5.740 Subsection 362(a)(4)
Subsection 362(a)(4) prohibits:
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property
of the estate[.]48
This provision protects the integrity of property of the estate and bars the
creation, perfection or enforcement of any lien against that property. A
lien is defined as any "charge against or interest in property to secure
payment of a debt or performance of an obligation."49 The definition
includes judicial liens, statutory liens, mortgages and other consentual
liens.5O
5.750 Subsection 362(a)(5)
Affording protection to the debtor, § 362(a)(5) enjoins:
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the
debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that
arose before the commencement of the case under this title[.]5 1
While § 362(a)(4) bars lien enforcement against property of the estate,
§ 362(a)(5) prohibits such acts against property of the debtor, but unlike
§ 362(a)(4) protection is only accorded under § 362(a)(5) if the action is
predicated on a prepetition claim.
5.760 Subsection 362(a)(6)
Though largely, if not completely replowing the same terrain as
§ 362(a)(1), § 362(a)(6) expresses a ban against:
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor
that arose before the commencement of the case under this
title[.]52
As with § 362(a)(1), only actions against the debtor on prepetition claims
are barred.
" Gulf Tampa Drydock Co. v. Ins. Co. of North Am. (In Re Gulf Tampa Drydock Co.), 49
Bankr. 154 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985).
48 Section 362(a)(4).
49 Section 101(31).
50 Commonwealth of Penna., Dept. of Public Welfare, v. Griggs (In Re Griggs), 12
Bankr. 443 (Bankr. E.D. Fla. 1981).
Section 362(a)(5).
5 Section 362(a)(6).
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5.770 Subsection 362(a)(7)
This provision restricts postpetition setoffs by enjoining:
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title against any claim
against the debtor[.] 53
Exceptions are provided under § 362(b)(6) and (b)(7). By its terms the
provision does not bar the setoff of two postpetition debts. Where under
applicable Pennsylvania law, the retention of a debtor's funds by a
creditor provided sufficient evidence of an intent to setoff, the IRS
violated § 362(a)(7) merely by its retention of the debtor's tax refund
check which was property of the estate.5 4 Because the Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 added to § 362(a)(3) the
language that the "exercise of control over property of the estate" is a
violation of the stay, a creditor is apparently under an affirmative duty to
turnover all property of the estate to the debtor or, if applicable, the
trustee, or risk contempt under § 362(a)(3). 55
As a collateral matter, the right of setoff in bankruptcy is preserved,
with some modification, in 11 U.S.C. § 553. For the principles governing
the substantive right of setoff, see applicable nonbankruptcy law. See,
infra, for discussion on obtaining relief from the stay to setoff debts.
5.780 Subsection 362(a)(8)
Simply enough, § 362(a)(8) prohibits:
(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the
United States Tax Court concerning the debtor.5 6
5.800 Actions Exempted from the Automatic Stay
5.810 Subsection 362(b)(1)
Section § 362(b)(1) expressly states that the filing of a petition for relief
under the Bankruptcy Code does not operate as a stay:
(1) under [§ 362(a)], of the commencement or continuation of a
criminal action or proceeding against the debtor[.]57
"The bankruptcy laws are not a haven for criminal offenders, but are
designed to give relief from financial overextension. Thus, criminal
" Section 362(a)(7).
64 U.S. v. Norton, 717 F.2d 767 (3d Cir. 1983).
55 See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
56 Section 362(a)(8).
17 Section 362(b)(1).
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actions and proceedings may proceed in spite of bankruptcy."5 8
Although criminal actions are exempted from the stay, civil actions,
whether by the government or private citizens, are not exempted. But
see, § 362(b)(4) and (b)(5)(exempting certain government actions). None-
theless, the distinction between criminal and civil actions blurs on
occasion, such as when a prosecution for passing bad checks is initiated at
the behest of the creditor. In such actions the creditor's intent is to obtain
payment on the check notwithstanding the pendency of the bankruptcy
and the prospect of discharge in bankruptcy of the debt arising from the
bounced check. The language of § 362(b)(1) intimates that regardless of
whether bad check charges are brought against the debtor by the district
attorney or in a private criminal complaint by the creditor, the action is
not stayed by § 362(a).5 9
To augment the scope of § 362(a), debtors have often requested an
injunction under 11 U.S.C. § 105 in order to bar the continuation of the
bad check prosecution. The language of § 105 has been found sufficiently
broad to allow a United States court to stay state court proceedings upon
the proper facts. 60
" S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 5787, 5837.
" Davis. v. Sheldon, 691 F.2d 176 (3d Cir. 1982)(the court assumed that the action was
not stayed).
" Davis v. Sheldon, 691 F.2d 176. Questions on the interaction of§ 362(a) and bad check
prosecutions have arisen numerous items due to the concantenation of several issues among
which are: the doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) on the comity between
federal courts and state criminal prosecutions; the supercession of protection from § 362(a)
to § 524(1) on the debtor's discharge; and the dischargeability of the debt for the bounced
check or court ordered restitution on such a check. The following analysis of the problem is
pieced together from numerous cases, some of which are in conflict, plus various provisions
of the Bankruptcy Code. Due to the unsettled state of the law in this field one should
continue to monitor or review late developments in the case law.
To augment the scope of § 362(a), debtors have often requested an injunction under § 105
to bar the continuation of the bad check prosecution. One obstacle to such relief is 28 U.S.C.
§ 2283, (1977) "the Anti-Injunction Act," which states that, "A court of the United States
may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly
authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, to protect or
effectuate its judgments." The language of § 105 has been found sufficiently broad to allow
a United States court to stay state court proceedings upon the proper facts. Davis v.
Sheldon, 691 F.2d 176, 177-78 (3d Cir. 1982). A bankruptcy judge may exercise his
authority under § 105(a) to enjoin litigants from appearing before another court. Davis, 691
F.2d at 175, 177-78 n.5. The power of a federal court to enjoin state court proceedings is
tightly circumscribed and should not be used except under extraordinary circumstances
where there is a great and immediate danger of irreparable harm to the plaintiffs federally
protected rights that cannot be eliminated by his defense to a single prosecution. Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 31 (1971). The state prosecution may be enjoined if it is brought in
bad faith. Davis v. Sheldon, 691 F.2d at 177, 178. It is generally held that the bringing of
the criminal act for the purpose of collecting on the debt is apparently not bad faith per se.
Id. Even if restitution is the sole purpose of a state criminal proceeding, at least one court
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5.820 Subsection 362(b)(2)
Under § 362(b)(2) the stay does act as an injunction:
(2) Under [§ 362(a)], of the collection of alimony, maintenance, or
support from property that is not property of the estate[. 61
As stated in § 362(b)(2), the collection of alimony, maintenance or support
is not hampered by the automatic stay if the property sought is not
property of the estate.62 The most important application of this rule is in
the collection of postpetition wages from services performed by an
individual chapter 7 or 11 debtor. By implication through 11 U.S.C. §
541(a)(6), such earnings are not property of the estate and attempts to
collect those wages to satisfy claims of alimony, maintenance or support
would not be precluded by the automatic stay. In a chapter 13 proceeding
the automatic stay would bar the collection of those wages to satisfy those
claims since those wages are included in the estate under 13 U.S.C. §
1306(a)(2). 63 In chapter 7, 11 or 13 the automatic stay bars the collection
of alimony, maintenance or support from property of the estate. 64
The stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) barring any act against the property of
the estate continues only until the property is no longer property of the
estate.65 When property is exempted under 11 U.S.C. § 522, that property
is no longer property of the estate. Thus, that aspect of the stay is lifted
when the property is exempted. Under 11 U.S.C. § 522(c), exempted
has held that an injunction under § 105 should not be issued. Walsh v. Abrams (In Re
Walsh), 45 Bankr. 668, 673 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985). A criminal action is brought in bad
faith when the complaining witness has insufficient evidence to support the allegations,
when the prosecuting authority has reason to doubt the validity of the charges or when the
prosecuting authority fails to exerise independent judgment in continuing the prosecution.
In Re Jerzak, 47 Bankr. 771, 773 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1985). Contrariwise, courts have held
that the action can be enjoined if the "primary purpose" of the action is the collection of the
debt. Hansen v. State of Washington, Kitsap County Prosecuting Attroneys (in Re Hansen),
48 Bankr. 107, 110 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1985); see also, Underwood v. DeLay (In Re DeLay),
48 Bankr. 282, 285 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984)("A criminal prosecution of the debtor may be in
violation of the automatic stay if it is part of an'aggressive compaign' to collect a debt.") This
latter approach affords little more than a slippery, unworkable standard and it should be
overruled. The "bad faith" rule enunciated in Sheldon is much more practicable.
One of the sentencing options typically available to the state criminal court for passing
bad checks is restitution. The Supreme Court has recently held that such debt are not
dischargeable. Kelly v. Robinson, 107 S. Ct. 353.
61 Section 362(b)(2).
62 id.
3 Mack v. Commonwealth of Penna., Dept. of Public Welfare (In Re Mack), 46 Bankr.
652 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985).
64 Section 362(a)(3).
65 Section 362(c)(1).
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property is generally not liable for satisfaction of prepetition debts during
or after the case because the statute excludes debts for alimony, mainte-
nance or child support.66 Thus, a creditor holding a claim for alimony,
maintenance or child support may proceed against exempted property
after the court grants or denies the debtor his discharge.
5.830 Subsection 362(b)(3)
The filing of a petition in bankruptcy does not operate as a stay:
(3) under [§ 362(a)], of any act to perfect an interest in property to
the extent that the trustee's rights and powers are subject to such
perfection under section 546(b) of this title or to the extent that
such act is accomplished within the period provided under section
547(e)(2)(A) of this title[.]67
Section 546(b) states as follows:
(b) The rights and powers of a trustee under sections 544, 545 and
549 of this title are subject to any generally applicable law that
permits perfection of an interest in property to be effective
against an entity that acquires rights in such property before the
date of such perfection. If such law requires a seizure of such
property or commencement of an action to accomplish such
perfection, and such property has not been seized or such action
has not been commenced before the date of the filing of the
petition, such interest in such property shall be perfected by
notice within the time fixed by such law for such seizure or
commencement. 68
Under 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(A) a creditor may perfect a security interest
in property within ten days after the debtor first has rights in the
collateral. If the petition is filed during this ten day period the stay will
not bar the creditor from perfecting within the reminder of the ten day
period.6 9
5.840 Subsections 362(b)(4) and (b)(5)
Subsections 362(b)(4) and (b)(5) mandate that § 362(a) will not act as a
stay:
(4) under [§ 36 2 (a)(1)], of the commencement or continuation of
an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such
66 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(1); 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5).
67 Section 362(b)(3).
66 Section 546(b).
9 Yobe Electric, Inc. v. Graybar Electric Co., 728 F.2d 207 (3d Cir. 1984)(postpetition
filing of mechanic's lien under Pennsylvania law was not violative of the stay under the
facts presented).
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governmental unit's police or regulatory power; (5) under [§
362(a)(2)], of the enforcement of a judgment, other than a money
judgment, obtained in an action or proceeding by a governmental
unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or regulatory
power[.]70
Under these two provisions the stay does not bar a governmental unit
from commencing or continuing an action against the debtor or enforcing
a judgment against him when the government is acting to enforce its
police or regulatory power.
Subsection 362(b)(4) accords a limited exception only to § 362(a)(1)
while 362(b)(5) affords a similar exception to § 362(a)(2). The other
exceptions to § 362(b) apply to § 362(a) in toto rather than only to specific
numbered sections of § 362(a). Query as to the meaning of this limitation.
Thus, according to the literal terms of the statute, the stay imposed by the
other subsections of § 362(a) is apparently not undercut by § 362(b)(4) and
(b)(5).
As stated by Congressman Don Edwards, Chairman of the Subcommit-
tee on Civil and Constitutional Rights to the House Committee of the
Judiciary, in explaining Congress's intent prior to the enactment of §
362(b)(4):
Section 362(b)(4) indicates that the stay under Section
362(a)(1) does not apply to affect the commencement or continu-
ation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce
the governmental units police or regulatory power. This section is
intended to be given a narrow construction in order to permit
governmental units to pursue actions to protect health and safety
and not to apply to actions by a governmental unit to protect a
pecuniary interest in property of the debtor or property of the
estate.
7 1
These remarks amplify the explanation given in the Committee Report:
Paragraph [362(b)(4)] excepts commencement or continuation
of actions and proceedings by governmental units to enforce
police or regulatory powers. Thus, where a governmental unit is
suing a debtor to prevent or stop violation of fraud, environmen-
tal protection, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or
regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for violation of
such a law, the action or proceeding is not stayed under the
70 Section 362(b)(4)-(5).
71 124 CoNG. REc. H32395.
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automatic stay. Paragraph [362(b)(5)] makes clear that the ex-
ception extends to permit an injunction and enforcement of an
injunction, and to permit the entry of a money judgment, but does
not extend to permit enforcement of a money judgment. Since the
assets of a debtor are in the possession and control of the
bankruptcy court, and since they constitute a fund out of which
all creditors are entitled to share, enforcement by a governmental
unit of a money judgment would give it preferential treatment to
the detriment of all other creditors. 72
The case law has adopted the pecuniary purpose test. 73 One court stated
that, "Congress indicated in 11 U.S.C. § 362(b), however, that preserving
the debtor's estate was not always the dominant goals."
74
Thus, in order to enforce its police or regulatory power, a government
could, for instance, obtain an injunction against the debtor or the estate
even though compliance with that injunction would give rise to the
expenditure of money of the estate.7 5
5.850 Subsections 362(b)(6) and (b)(7)
The bar of § 362(a) does not operate as an injunction:
(6) under § 362(a)], of the setoff by a commodity broker, financial
institution, or securities clearing agency of any mutual debt and
claim under or in connection with commodity contracts, as
72 H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 343 reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
5787, 6299.
73 See, e.g., Organized Maintenance, Inc. v. Ford (In Re Organized Maintencance, Inc.)
47 Bankr. 791 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985)(on the basis of this test, pending administrative
enforcement proceedings brought by the Secretary of Labor under the Service Contract Act
of 1965 was automatically stayed by § 362(a)(and such a proceeding was not insulated by §
362(b)(4)); In Re Historic Lower Mill Assoc., 49 Bankr. 66 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1985)(under §
362(b)(5) the stay did not bar a municipality from enforcing a prepetition judgment that
enjoined the debtor from "using or maintaining" a parcel of its realty on the basis that the
debtor did not obtain the requisite certificate of occupancy, although the injunction would
prove costly to the estate); U.S. v. Ilco, Inc., 48 Bankr. 1016 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1985)(suit by
the U.S. against the debtor not stayed where the complaint sought an injunction compelling
removal of waste by the debtor notwithstanding the fact that such removal would deplete
funds of the estate); Lacoquille Investment Co., Inc. v. Town of Manalapan (In Re Lacoquille
Investment Co., Inc.), 44 Bankr. 731 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984)(postpetition enactment of
zoning ordinance which decreased the value of the debtor's property did not violate the stay
due to § 362(b)(4)); U.S. v. Standard Metals Corp., 49 Bankr. 623 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1985)(entry of judgment against the debtor and in favor of the government on a fine was not
stayed due to § 362(b)(4) and (b)(5), the court basing its decision on the distinction between
entry of money judgment and its enforcement).
74 U.S. v. Ilco, Inc., 48 Bankr. at 1023.
" Penn Terra, Ltd. v. Dept. of Environmental Resources, 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir.
1984)(injunction to abate environmental hazard).
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defined in section 761(4) of this title, forward contracts, or
securities contracts, as defined in section 741(7) of this title, that
constitutes the setoff of a claim against the debtor for a margin
payment as defined in section 741(5) or 761(15) of this title, or
settlement payment, as defined in section 741(8) of this title,
arising out of commodity contracts, forward contracts, or securi-
ties contracts against cash, securities, or other property held by or
due from such commodity broker, forward contract merchant,
stockbrocker, financial institution, or securities clearing agency
to margin, guarantee, secure, or settle commodity contracts,
forward contracts, or securities contracts;
(7) under [§ 362(a)], of the setoff by a repo participant, of any
mutual debt and claim under or in connection with repurchase
agreements that constitutes the setoff of a claim against the
debtor for a margin payment, as defined in section 741(5) or
761(15) of this title, or settlement payment, as defined in section
741(8) of this title, arising out of repurchase agreements against
cash, securities, or other property held by or due from such repo
participant to margin, guarantee, secure or settle repurchase
agreements[.] 7 6
Subsection 362(b)(7) was added by the Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984. Further discussion of these provisions is
beyond the scope of this work.
5.860 Subsection 362(b)(8)
Under § 362(b)(8) the filing of a petition does not operate as a stay:
(8) under [§ 362(a)], of the commencement of any action by the
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to foreclose a
mortgage or deed of trust in any case in which the mortgage or
deed of trust held by the Secretary is insured or was formerly
insured under the National Housing Act and covers property, or
combinations of property, consisting of five or more living
units[.]77
5.870 Subsection 362(b)(9)
Under § 362(b)(9) the stay does not enjoin:
(9) under [§ 362(a)], the issuance to the debtor by a governmental
unit of a notice of a tax deficiency[.] 78
71 Section 362(b)(6)-(7).
77 Section 362(b)(8).
71 Section 362(b)(9).
1986]
17Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1986
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
Also, § 505(c) provides:
(c) Notwithstanding section 362 of this title, after determination
by the court of a tax under this section, the governmental unit
charged with responsibility for collection of such tax may assess
such tax against the estate, the debtor, or a successor to the
debtor, as the case may be, subject to any otherwise applicable
law.
7 9
Proceedings before the tax court would nonetheless be stayed.8C
5.880 Subsection 362(b)(10)
The injunction of § 362(a) does not operate as a stay:
[10] under [N 362(a)], of any act by a lessor to the debtor under a
lease of nonresidential real property that has terminated by the
expiration of the stated term of the lease before the commence-
ment of or during a case under this title to obtain possession of
such property.8 '
This provision was added to the Bankruptcy Code by the Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 although the subsection
was denominated " 362(b)(9)," notwithstanding the pre-existence of
another " 362(b)(9)."
The landlord's right of repossesion might still be restricted under 11
U.S.C. § 108(b) if the lease, by its terms, expired during the 60 day period
following the filing of the petition. In that situation, if the terms of
the lease provide a sufficient basis by which § 108(b) would be triggered,
the debtor would still have a right to possession until at least the end
of the 60 day period. See, also the brief discussion, below, on § 108(b)
under the analysis on the stay and the tolling of time.
5.890 Subsection 362(b)(11)
Under § 362(b)(11) the stay does not act as a bar:
(11) under [N 362(a)], of the presentment of a negotiable instru-
ment and the giving of notice of and protesting dishonor of such
an instrument.8 2
As with § 362(b)(10), this provision was also added to the statute by the
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, and though
designated " 362(b)(10)," to preserved the format of §362(b) it should
probably be § 362(b)(11).
79 Section 505(c).
1o Section 362(a)(8).
s Section 362(b)(10).
82 Section 362(b)(11).
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6.000 AIRCRAFr VESSELS AND EQUIPMENT
As to the holders of certain interests in aircraft, ships and specific
aircraft parts under § 1110 in a chapter 11 case, the duration of the
automatic stay is generally limited to 60 days after the filing of the
petition. Section 1110 states as follows:
(a) The right of a secured party with a purchase-money
equipment security interest in, or of a lessor or conditional
vendor of, whether as trustee or otherwise, aircraft, aircraft
engines, propellers, appliance, or spare parts, as defined in
section 101 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. 1301),
or vessels of the United States, as defined in subsection B(4) of
the Ship Mortgage Act, 1920 (46 U.S.C. 911(4)), that are subject
to a purchase-money equipment security interest granted by,
leased to, or conditionally sold to, a debtor that is an air carrier
operating under a certificate of convenience and necessity issued
by the Civil Aeronautics Board, or a water carrier that holds a
certificate of public convenience and necessity or permit issued
by the Interstate Commerce Commission, as the case may be, to
take possession of such equipment in compliance with the
provisions of a purchase-money equipment security agreement,
lease, or conditional sale contract, as the case may be, is not
affected by section 362 or 363 of this title or any power of the
court to enjoin such taking of possession unless-
(1) before 60 days after the date of the order for relief under this
chapter, the trustee, subject to the court's approval, agrees to
perform all obligations of the debtor that become due on or after
such date under such security agreement, lease, or conditional
sale contract, as the case may be; and
(2) any default, other than a default of a kind specified in
section 365(b)(2) of this title, under such security agreement,
lease, or conditional sale contract, as the case may be-
(A) that occurred before such date is cured before the expi-
ration of such 60-day period; and
(B) that occurs after such date is cured before the later of-
(i) 30 days after the date of such default; and
(ii) the expiration of such 60 day period.
(b) The trustee and the secured party, lessor, or conditional
vendor, as the case may be, whose right to take possession is
protected under subsection (a) of this section may agree, subject
to the court's approval, to extend the 60-day period specified in
subsection (a)(1) of this section.8 3
83 Section 1110.
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The provision, applicable only in chapter 11, expressly states that § 362
does not apply as to the collateral described and that the court's
injunctive powers are limited by the terms of § 1110. The legislative
history contains provisions reflective of portions of bills which were
enacted, and, thus, reliance on those specific parts of the history would be
unjustified.
7.000 THE TOLLING OF TIME IS NOT STAYED BY SECTION 362(A)
The majority rule is that the running of time is not affected by the
automatic stay.8 4 Recourse may nonetheless be accorded under certain
circumstances through § 108(b):
(b) Except as provided in [§ 108(a)], if applicable nonbankruptcy
law, a order entered in a nonbankruptcy proceeding, or an
agreement fixes a period within which the debtor or an individual
protected under section 1301 of this title may file any pleading,
demand, notice or proof of claim or loss, cure a default, or perform
any other similar act, and such period has not expired before the
date of the filing of the petition, the trustee [or debtor in
possession, 11 U.S.C. § 1107] may only file, cure, or perform, as
the case may be, before the later of-
(1) the end of such period, including any suspension of such
period occurring on or after the commencement of the case; or
(2) 60 days after the order for relief.8 5
Another view was expressed in Moody v. Amoco. s6 The court held "that
section 108(b) does not apply to curing defaults in executory contracts.
Section 365 specifically governs the time for curing defaults in executory
contracts, and thus, it controls here."8 7 This author questions the result
in Moody since the language of 11 U.S.C. § 108(b) clearly states that if
8' In Re Players' Pub, Inc., 45 Bankr. 387, 392 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985)(The stay does not
bar a lease from lapsing postpetition according to its own terms).
s' Johnson v. First National Bank of Montevideo, Minn., 719 F.2d 270 (8th Cir.
1983)(Where state law authorized fixed redemption period following foreclosure of lien on
reality, § 362(a) did not toll the running of the time period; under § 105(a) the bankruptcy
court lacked power to stay the running of the period; under § 108(b) the debtor has at least
60 days to redeem.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1015; General Motors Acceptance Corp. v.
Morgan (In Re Morgan), 23 Bankr. 700 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982)(§ 108(b) applies to
redemption periods rather than § 362(a)); In Re G-N Partners, 48 Bankr. 462 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1985)(recognizing the general rule that the running of time is not tolled by § 362(a),
but holding that although the debtor filed a petition under chapter 11 only minutes prior to
the expiration of an option contract to purchase realty, under 11 U.S.C. the expiration was
automatically extended for sixty days); In Re Amant, 41 Bankr. 156 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1984)(contra Johnson,) (collecting cases).
se Moody v. Amoco, 734 F.2d 1200, 1215 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 386 (1984).
s Id. at 1215.
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"an agreement fixes a period within which the debtor... may... cure a
default .... " then the debtor has until the later of the end of such period
or 60 days after the filing of the petition. § 108(b) (emphasis added). The
term "agreement" would seem to include "contracts."
8.000 IMPLICIT EXCEPTION TO SECTION 3 6 2 (A) - ACTIONS PENDING IN THE
BANKRUPTCY COURT
Although not expressly stated in § 362(b), actions may be commenced
against the debtor or the estate, in the bankruptcy court where the
debtor's bankruptcy petition is pending so long as the action is parasitic
to that bankruptcy case. The action is parasitic only if the matter may
properly be commenced under the same bankruptcy caption as the
petition although the institution of an adversary case bearing the
adversary caption and that bankruptcy petition caption would also be
allowable. Any other result would lead to an unnecessary multiplication
of proceedings. Parties would seek relief from the stay prior to the filing
of any action against the debtor or the estate that would otherwise be
barred by § 362(a). Thus, a creditor seeking a reclamation of his goods
against a debtor may commence suit in the bankruptcy court where the
petition is pending without the need to seek relief from the stay.
9.000 THE IMPLICIT EXCEPTION TO SECTION 36 2 (A) IS NOT APPLICABLE TO
ACTIONS REMOVED TO THE BANKRUPTCY COURT
When an action is removed to the bankruptcy court from another
federal court or a state court, the stay is not implicitly modified even
though the matter is proceeding under the same bankruptcy caption as
the bankruptcy petition. At least this is the suggestion provided by the
Advisory Committee Notes to Bankruptcy Rule 9027 on removal. "If the
claim or cause of action which is removed to the bankruptcy court is
subject to the automatic stay of § 362 of the Code, the litigation may not
proceed in the bankruptcy court until relief from the stay is granted."88 A
contrary result would apparently prompt creditors to file applications for
removal on actions stayed in another forum by § 362(a), rather than seek
relief from the automatic stay, since the removal application is effective
immediately on filing, while a motion for relief from the stay requires
court action following an opportunity for a hearing.
Removal is authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1452 and, as mentioned above,
Bankruptcy Rule 9027.
" Bankruptcy Rule 9027 advisory committee notes.
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10.000 AUTOMATIC STAY BARS THE CONTINUATION OF THE APPELLATE PROCESS
Several U.S. Courts of Appeals have held that the filing of bankruptcy
by one party to the appellate processes bars the continuation of that
appeal.89
II. THE SCOPE OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY MAY BE AUGMENTED UNDER
11 U.S.C. SECTION 105(A) ON MOTION OF A PARTY IN INTEREST
11.000 AUGMENTATION OF THE STAY UNDER 11 U.S.C. § 105(A)
Even though an action may not be barred by the automatic stay, the
court has the power under § 105 to prohibit a party from continuing a
present or proposed course of action. 90 The case law in this area has not
yet firmly established the limits of the courts' discretion in most areas of
this field, yet it appears that courts are reluctant to go beyond the scope
of § 362(a) in the absence of a significant, if not extraordinary, showing.9 1
Under the doctrine of Younger v. Harris,9 2 it seems fairly well estab-
lished by the case law that a bankruptcy court may not enjoin the
litigants in criminal matters in the absence of bad faith, harassment or
the like.93 Thus, for example, attempts to halt criminal prosecutions
for bounced check charges are generally not likely to succeed.
" Ellison v. Northwest Engineering Co., 707 F.2d 1310, 1311 (11th Cir. 1983)(where one
party to an appeal filed a petition for relief under the Bankruptcy Code, the Eleventh
Circuit held that the stay barred the court from issuing an opinion in the appeal absent
relief from the stay); Assoc. of St. Croix Condominium Owners v. St. Croix Hotel Corp., 682
F.2d 446 (3d Cir. 1982)("[S]ection 362(a) should be read to stay all appeals in proceedings
that were originally brought against the debtor, regardless of whether the debtor is the
appellant or appellee.") (emphasis in original); Cathey v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 711
F.2d 60 (6th Cir. 1983)(same).
9' Compton Corp. v. U.S. Dept. of Energy (In Re Compton Corp.) 40 Bankr. 880, 882
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1984); In Re Anje Jewelry Co., 47 Bankr. 485, 486 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1983); S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 5787, 5837.
9' Briggs Transportation Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 739 F.2d 341
(8th Cir. 1984)(although the bankruptcy court authorized the debtor to abrogate its
collective bargaining agreement with the debtor, the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§
101-115, barred the bankruptcy court's issuance of an injunction against the union's
pickets), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 295 (1984); Heaven Sent Ltd. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co.
(In Re Heaven Sent Ltd.), 37 Bankr. 597 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984)(section 105 did not give the
bankruptcy court power to compel an insurer to renew an insurance policy where the policy
did not reserve to the debtor such right in the absence of bankruptcy); Bogey's Barn, Ltd. v.
Indiana Ins. Co. (In Re Bogey), 47 Bankr. 555 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985)(same).
92 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
9 Davis v. Sheldon, 691 F.2d 176 (3d Cir. 1982); Barnette v. Evans, 673 F,2d 1250 (11
Cir. 1982).
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The bankruptcy court may enjoin under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) federal
regulatory proceedings "when those proceedings 'threaten' the assets of
the debtor's estate."94
Postpetition suits against the trustee or debtor in possession may be
brought under 28 U.S.C. § 959(a) which provides as follows:
(a) Trustees, receivers or managers of any property, including
debtors in possession, may be sued, without leave of the court
appointing them, with respect to any of their acts or transactions
in carrying on business connected with such property. Such
actions shall be subject to the general equity powers of such court
so far as the same may be necessary to the ends ofjustice, but this
shall not deprive a litigant of this right to trial by jury.95
The court may enjoin such a suit under § 105(a) in limited circumstances:
The harmonizing construction that we adopt, one which accords
with the legislative history of § 959(a), is that a court action
against reorganization trustees relating to business activities of
the bankrupt carried on by the trustee may proceed unless the
bankruptcy court, exercising sound discretion, finds that the
action would embarrass, burden, delay or otherwise impede the
reorganization proceeding. 96
III. VIOLATIONS OF THE STAY: EFFECTS AND REMEDIES
12.000 VIOLATIONS OF THE STAY MAY BE REDRESSED THROUGH CIVIL CONTEMPT
Violations of the automatic stay may be redressed through an action for
civil contempt. Fidelity Mortgage Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc.97 A
finding of civil contempt must be predicated on a specific and definite
order of the court.98 The automatic stay of § 362(a) is effectively a court
order with sufficient specificity for purposes of contempt.99 Contempt can
9 N.L.R.B. v. Superior Forwarding, Inc., 762 F.2d 695, 698 (8th Cir. 1985).
9 Section 959(a).
96 Hudson River Sloop Clearwater v. Revere Copper Products (In Re Reverse Copper and
Brass, Inc.) 32 Bankr. 725, 728 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1983)(quoting Jaytee-Penndel Co. v. Bloor
(In Re Investors Funding Corp.), 547 F.2d 13, 16 (2d Cir. 1976)(cites omitted)).
For a discussion of the use of § 105(a) to reinstitute the stay after it has lapsed under §
362(e) or the use of 105(a) to preclude such a lapse see infra under § 362(e).
9' Fidelity Mortgage Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1093 (1977).
" Camelia, 550 F.2d at 51; Abt. v. Household Finance Co. (In Re Abt), 2 Bankr. 323, 325
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980).
" Camelia, 550 F.2d at 51; Assoc. Hobby Manufacturers, Inc. v. Rohde & Liesenfeld,
GMBH & Co. (In Re Assoc. Hobby Manufacturers, Inc.), 33 Bankr. 959,962 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1983).
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be successfully charged only if the creditor had knowledge of the
stay.100
A creditor's knowledge that a bankruptcy petition was filed, absent
concommitant knowledge that such a filing gives rise to a stay, is not
sufficient although there is contrary authority.1o1 Nonetheless, some
courts previously held that a party's failure to rectify an unwitting
violation of the stay after receiving knowledge of the stay may constitute
contempt. 10 2 With the passage of the Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, § 362(a)(3) was amended to stay the
"exercise control over property of the estate." The amendment apparently
mandates that parties holding property of the estate turnover that
property to the debtor, or if applicable, the trustee, or risk a finding of
contempt for violating § 362(a)(3). Nonetheless, § 362(a)(3) may now be at
odds with the turnover requirements of § 542.103 Thus, the Behm line of
cases is apparently in accord with the amendment while the Abt line is
now in derogation of it.
To prevail in an action for contempt the debtor must prove the
pertinent facts under the "clear and convincing" standard of evidence
rather than the more common civil standard of a "preponderence of the
evidence."' 0 4 Nevertheless, a violation of the automatic stay will not
support a finding of contempt in all cases.'0 5 Each violation of the stay
must be considered in its entirety, with due consideration given to the
underlying facts, prior to a finding of contempt. 0 6 The power of contempt
should generally be reserved for actions evincing a contumacious frame of
mind. 07
Good faith does not immunize a party from civil contempt for violating
a court order. 108 This rule is applicable in bankruptcy, 10 9 and apparently
100 Camelia, 550 F.2d at 51; In Re Hardy, 39 Bankr. 64, 66 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984).
101 See, e.g., Superior Propane v. Zartun (In Re Zartun), 30 Bankr. 543, 546 (Bankr. 9th
Cir. 1983)(knowledge of the filing, abasent knowledge of the stay, is a sufficient basis for
requisite "knowledge").
102 In Re Behm, 44 Bankr. 811 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1984); Miller v. Savings Bank of
Baltimore (In Re Miller), 22 Bankr. 479 (D. Md. 1982), affd, 10 Bankr. 778 (Bankr. D. Md.
1981); Abt v. Household Finance Co. But see (In Re Aht), 2 Bankr. 323, 325 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1980).
103 See supra text accompanying notes 44-47.
104 Quinter v. Volkswagen of America, 676 F.2d 969, 974 (3d Cir. 1982).
.o Porter v. Goodyear Employees Credit Union (In Re Porter), 25 Bankr. 425, 527
(Bankr. D. Vt. 1982); Ramage v. Ramage (In Re Ramage), 39 Bankr. 37,39 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1984).
106 Porter, 25 Bankr. at 427; Ramage, 39 Bankr. at 39.
107 Revere Copper Products, Inc. v. Hudson River Sloop Clearwaters, Inc. (In Re Revere
Copper and Brass, Inc.), 29 Bankr. 584, 589 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983), affd 32 Bankr. 725
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983); Ramage, 39 Bankr. at 39.
'o' McLean v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 762 F.2d
1204, 1210 (4th Cir. 1985).
109 Id.
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also applicable for violations of the automatic stay. Nonetheless, a party
will not be held in contempt unless he violates a "specific order of the
court while possessing actual knowledge of that order." 110
The above case law developed in the absence of § 362(h), which was
added by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of
1984. This provision states that an "individual" injured by a willful
violation of the automatic stay shall recover actual damages, including
costs and attorney's fees, and in appropriate circumstances, may recover
punitive damages. Query as to whether the courts will apply the above
case law in interpreting § 362(h).
Lastly, the term "individual" which appears in § 362(h) is used
elsewhere in the Bankruptcy Code to mean only living, breathing human
beings; corporations, partnerships and the like are excluded.", Since §
362(h) was added by the 1984 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code in
1978, a lack of parallelism between the meaning of an "individual" in the
portions added by the 1984 amendment and the original 1978 Bank-
ruptcy Code may be inadvertent due to the passage of the two statutes by
different Congresses. To this author there is no logic or purpose in
limiting the definition of an "individual" in § 362(h) to living, breathing
entities, and it is expected that the case law will ultimately support the
broader definition. 112 Furthermore, assuming the definition of an "indi-
vidual" in § 362(h) is held to be restricted to living beings, the case law
cited above has not been expressly "overruled" by that provision; none-
theless, a court may possibly hold that it is implicitly in conflict with §
362(h) and that the case law is no longer valid on whether non-
individuals may seek contempt. In the absence of a court ruling that the
provisions are in conflict, a debtor could apparently seek recovery either
under § 362(h) or the progeny of Camelia.
13.000 ACTIONS IN VIOLATION OF THE STAY, THOUGH NOT CONTUMACIOUS,
ARE VOID
Actions taken in violation of the automatic stay are generally void and
of no legal effect, notwithstanding the actor's ignorance of the filing of the
petition in bankruptcy as was held in Kalb v. Feuerstein."3 This is
110 Assoc. Hobby Manufacturers, Inc. v. Rodhe & Liesenfeld, GMBH & Co. (In Re Assoc.
Hobby Manufacturers, Inc.), 33 Bankr. 959, 962 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983).
... See, e.g., § 109(e)(only an "individual" may file for relief under chapter 13).
112 See, e.g., Tel-A-Communications Consultants, Inc. v. Auto-Use (In Re
Tel-A-Communications Consultants, Inc.), 50 Bankr. 250, (Bankr. D. Conn. 1985)(where a
contempt action was brought against a creditor who repossessed the debtor's auto, the court
held the § 362(h) is not limited to living, breathing entities.
113 Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940); Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Hall, 685
F.2d 1306, 1308 (11th Cir. 1982); Emerson Quiet Kool Corp. v. Marta Group, Inc. (In Re
Marta Group, Inc.), 33 Bankr. 634, 639 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983); In Re Behm, 44 Bankr. 811,
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true even in the absence of a finding of civil contempt. A creditor wishing
to validate acts performed in violation of the stay may move the court in
an appropriate situation for annulment of the automatic stay under §
362(d) as discussed below. Certain statutory exceptions exist to the rule
of Kalb v. Feuerstein. 14
IV. MODIFICATION AND TERMINATION OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY
14.000 RELIEF FROM THE AUTOMATIC STAY ON REQUEST OF A PARTY
IN INTEREST
14.100 Jurisdiction and the Proper Court to Grant Relief From the Stay
The Bankruptcy Court has jurisdiction to hear actions for relief from
the automatic stay and enter final orders thereon unless the district court
of that district has withdrawn from the bankruptcy court the reference of
the entire bankruptcy case or a portion of it embracing a creditor's motion
for relief from the stay." 5 Generally, the reference will not have been
withdrawn. Thus, the bankruptcy court where the bankruptcy petition
was filed is generally the place to seek relief from the stay. 116 If the
reference over that aspect of the case, or the entire case, has been
withdrawn, the district judge to whom the case has been withdrawn and
assigned is the party from whom to seek relief. Even though a bankruptcy
case is pending in a bankruptcy court of a particular United States
District Court, a judge of that district court typically many not grant
relief from the stay as to any matter, including civil actions pending in
his court against the debtor, unless the reference of that aspect of the
bankruptcy case has been withdrawn and assigned to that district
judge. 117 A district court other than one where the petition is pending
may not grant relief from the automatic stay.'1 8
14.200 Procedural Aspects of Requesting Relief From the Automatic
Stay
14.210 The Framework of the Bankruptcy Rules
Relief from the stay may be granted on motion under Bankruptcy Rules
4001(a) and 9014. Relief is no longer sought by complaint as was past
813 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1984); Organized Maintenance, Inc. v. Ford (In Re Organized
Maintenance, Inc.), 47 Bankr. 791, 793 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985); 2 Collier on Bankruptcy
(P)362.11 (15th ed. 1983).
114 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 549(c)-(d).
1 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(G); 1334 local order of reference from local district court.
lie Erti v. Paine Webber, (In Re Baldwin Corp.), 765 F.2d 343 (2d Cir. 1985); Cathey v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 711 F.2d 60, 63 (6th Cir. 1983).
"' NLT Computer Services Corp. v. Capital Computer Systems, Inc., 755 F.2d 1253, (6th
Cir. 1985).
11 In Re Baldwin-United Corp., 765 F.2d 343.
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practice under the former Bankruptcy Rules. 119 There is no charge for
filing the motion. As stated in Bankruptcy Rules 4001 and 9014:
Rule 4001. Relief from Automatic Stay; Use of Cash Collateral
(a) Request for Relief From Stay or To Use Cash Collateral. A
request for relief from an automatic stay provided by the Code or
for the use of cash collateral pursuant to § 363(c)(2) shall be made
in accordance with Rule 9014.
(b) Final Hearing on Stay. The stay of any act against property of
the estate under § 362(a) of the Code expires 30 days after a final
hearing is commenced pursuant to § 362(e)(2) unless within that
time the court denies the motion for relief from the stay.
(c) Ex Parte Relief from Stay. Relief from a stay under § 362(a)
may be granted without prior notice to the adverse party only if
(1) it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by
a verified motion that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or
damage will result to the movant before the adverse party or his
attorney can be heard in opposition, and (2) the movant's attorney
certifies to the court in writing the efforts, if any, which have
been made to give notice and the reasons why notice should not be
required. The party obtaining relief under this subdivision and §
362(f) shall immediately give oral notice thereof to the trustee or
debtor in possession and to the debtor and forthwith mail or
otherwise transmit to such person or persons a copy of the order
granting relief. On two days notice to the party who obtained
relief from the stay without notice or on shorter notice to that
party as the court may prescribe, the adverse party may appear
and move reinstatement of the stay. In that event, the court shall
proceed expeditiously to hear and determine the motion.
Rule 9014. Contested Matters
In a contested matter in a case under the Code not otherwise
governed by these rules, relief shall be requested by motion, and
reasonable notice and opportunity for hearing shall be afforded
the party against whom relief is sought. No response is required
under this rule unless the court orders an answer to a motion. The
motion shall be served in the manner provided for service of a
summons and complaint by Rule 7004, and, unless the court
otherwise directs, the following rules shall apply: 7021, 7025,
7026, 7028-37, 7041, 7042, 7052, 7054-7056, 7062, 7064, 7069 and
7071. The court may at any stage in a particular matter direct
that one or more of the other rules in Part VII apply. A person
19 See former Bankruptcy Rule 701.
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who desires to perpetuate testimony may proceed in the same
manner as provided in Rule 9027 for the taking of a deposition
before an adversary proceeding. The clerk shall give notice to the
parties of the entry of any order directing that additional rules of
Part VII are applicable or that certain of the rules of Part VII are
not applicable. The notice shall be given within such time as is
necessary to afforded the parties a reasonable opportunity to
comply with the procedures made applicable by the order. 120
14.220 Service of the Motion for Relief From the Stay
As is apparent from Rule 9014, the motion for relief from the automatic
stay must be served on the debtor and, if one is in the case, also on the
trustee. 121 According to the strict letter of the Rules the debtor and the
trustee are the proper objects of service and not their respective counsel. A
copy of the motion must be served on each respondent.
The means for serving the motion for relief from the stay is provided
by the Bankruptcy Rules. Bankruptcy Rule 9014 indicates that
Bankruptcy Rule 7004 is applicable in contested matters which include
motions for relief from the stay. Personal service of the motion may be
effected by any person not less than 18 years of age who is not a party. 12
2
Service may be implemented by any method of service authorized under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d) or by first class mail, postage prepaid under
Bankruptcy Rule 7004(b). Service on an individual who is not an infant
or incompetent may be made by mailing a copy of the summons and the
motion to the defendant's "dwelling house or usual place of abode or to
the place where he regularly conducts his business or profession."1 23
Service on a domestic or foreign corporation or upon a partnership or
other unincorporated association may be completed by mailing a copy of
the summons and the motion "to the attention of an officer, a managing
or general partner, or to any other agent authorized by appointment or
by law to receive service of process and, if the agent is one authorized by
statute to receive service and the statute so requires, by also mailing a
copy to the defendant. ' ' 124 Bankruptcy Rule 7004 also provides for service
of process on other types of defendants but the provisions summarized
here will suffice in all but a handful of situations.
120 Bankruptcy Rules 4001 and 9014.
121 First National Mortgage Assoc. v. DiBona (In Re DiBona), 7 Bankr. 798 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1980)(The trustee is an indispensable party in an action for relief from the stay).
122 Bankruptcy Rule 7004(a).
123 Bankruptcy Rule 7004(b)(1).
124 Bankruptcy Rule 7004(b)(3).
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14.230 No Response to the Motion for Relief From the Stay Under
Section 362(d) Required in the Absence of Court Rule or
Court Order
Under Rule 9014 the debtor and the trustee are not required to answer
a creditor's motion for relief from the automatic stay in the absence of a
specific order or rule of court to the contrary. 125 In one questionable case
from a federal district court, a local rule of the bankruptcy court which
mandated an answer to a motion for relief from the stay was held invalid
as being in derogation of Rule 9014.126 As a consequence, the bankruptcy
court for that district now enters, as a matter of course on each motion for
relief from the stay, an order mandating an answer and fixing a hearing
date for the motion.
In the absence of an answer and both a court order and a rule of court
mandating such an answer, the creditor would be required to appear at
the scheduled hearing on the motion if he wished to oppose it.
14.240 Opposition to Motion for Relief from the Co-Debtor Stay
under Section 1301 Requires Filing of an Answer
In chapter 13, when a creditor requests relief from the stay of actions
against one to whom the co-debtor stay of 11 U.S.C § 1301 applies, the
failure to file an answer within 20 days after the filing of the motion
causes the co-debtor stay to lapse as to the conduct proposed in the
motion.1 27
14.250 Effect of Conversion of the Case on Proper Joinder of
Parties on Request for Relief From the Stay
As stated above the proper defendants in an action for relief from the
automatic stay are the debtor, and if one is in the case, also the trustee.
If a case is converted from one chapter to another, the trustee in the
former aspect of the case is discharged as a matter of law and, if
applicable, a new trustee is appointed in the new chapter. The question
often arises on whether the granting of the motion for relief from the stay
against an entity who is no longer a proper party in the case is binding
against the current proper parties in the proceeding. For instance, if a
creditor prevails on a motion for relief from the stay in a chapter 7
proceeding against the debtor and the chapter 7 trustee, is that relief still
extant if the debtor converts the case to a chapter 13 proceeding thereby
triggering the discharge of the chapter 7 trustee in favor of the appoint-
ment of a chapter 13 trustee? The cases are split.125
125 But see discussion on the co-debtor stay under § 1301, infra note 127 and accompa-
nying text; a request for relief from which mandates an answer if the relief is opposed.
126 Newton Savings Assoc. v. Stinson, No. 83-5291, slip op. (E.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 1984).
127 11 U.S.C. § 1301(d).
128 See, e.g., Perkins v. Perkins (In Re Perkins), 36 Bankr. 618 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn.
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14.300 The Modes of Granting Relief From the Stay
Relief from the automatic stay may be granted under § 362(d) which
states as follows:
(1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an
interest in property of such party in interest; or
(2) with respect to a stay of an act against property under [§
362(a)], if
(A) the debtor does not have an equity in such property; and
(B) such property is not necessary to an effective reorganiza-
tion.129
Under the terms of § 362(d)(1) and (d)(2) an important distinction is
drawn. Relief under § 362(d)(2) may only be granted "with respect to a
stay of an act against property" of the estate. The language of § 362(d)(1)
is not thusly restricted and may be used as a basis for relief with respect
to a stay of an act against property of the estate or any other act.
As provided by § 362(d) the court may grant relief from the automatic
stay "such as by terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such
stay... ." The quoted language obviously provides the court with four
means to grant relief, although the presence of the expression "such as
by" apparently indicates that the four stated routes to relief are not
exhaustive of the court's power but are instead illustrative.
In commencing an examination of these four modes of relief, a
"termination" of stay apparently means a complete suspension of the
stay thus allowing all creditors and other parties to proceed in any
lawful manner against the debtor, his property or the bankruptcy estate.
Since one of the primary purposes of the Bankruptcy Code is to provide
the debtor with a "breathing spell" from creditors, which would
necessarily end on termination of the stay, this remedy is rarely, if ever,
used. A "modification" of the stay is the most often granted form of relief
from the stay since it cancels the stay as to one entity or as to one
particular act while still giving the debtor a "breathing spell" from the
remainder of his creditors. For example, the court may grant a mortgage
holder relief to pursue his state foreclosure remedies against a parcel of
encumbered property, with the court leaving the remainder of the stay
intact.
1983)(consent of chapter 13 trustee to relief from the stay was not binding on a chapter 7
trustee after conversion); A.E. Landvoight, Inc. v. Williams (In Re Williams), 40 Bankr. 366
(Bankr. D. Md. 1984)(where a request for relief from the stay was granted in a chapter 13
case, such relief was held binding on the chapter 7 trustee after conversion of the case,
notwithstanding the fact that according to local court rule a chapter 13 trustee is not a party
in interest in an action for relief from the stay).
129 11 U.S.C. § 362(d).
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The "conditioning" of the stay would most typically provide for a
"modification" of the stay on the triggering of an act or omission. For
instance, the court may order that the stay will be automatically lifted as
to a mortgage in the event that the debtor fails at some time in the future
to remain current in his payments on the mortgage debt. This is similar
to the situation in which the bankruptcy judge, at a hearing, grants relief
from the stay although the creditor has agreed with the debtor that the
creditor will not pursue such a course of action until the debtor defaults
under a repayment schedule (as opposed to a confirmed chapter 11 or 13
plan). This occurred in In Re Bricker Systems, Inc.13 0 A conditioning of
the stay or a utilization of the method employed in Bricker spares the
creditor the need to return to bankruptcy court for another hearing or for
a subsequent presention of an order granting relief from the stay, thus
saving the creditor precious time. 131
The least explored option among the four alternatives is an "annul-
ment" of the stay. In effect, an "annulment" extinguishes the stay ab
initio as to a particular creditor or a particular act, although the stay
conceivably could be annulled in toto as to all parties and acts. Of the four
means of granting relief from the automatic stay, only annulment
reaches back in time to reverse the prior effect of the stay. A "termina-
tion" or "modification" is effective only upon entry on the docket of the
order granting such relief. A "conditioning" of the stay would generally
preserve the full effect of the stay as of the time of the entry of the order
granting relief but would be subject to automatic "modification" effective
prospectively on the occurrence of some future triggering act or omis-
sion. 132
Annulling the automatic stay may have significant utility. For in-
stance, a creditor may conclude foreclosure proceedings against a parcel
of the debtor's realty without knowing that the debtor filed for bank-
ruptcy. The debtor, realizing that foreclosure has occurred and that he
could not provide adequate protection to the encumbrance holder, decides
130 In Re Bricker, 44 Bankr. 952 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1984).
131 On a conditioning of the stay see, e.g., Browning v. Navarro, 37 Bankr. 201 (N.D.
Tex.1983)(district court's affirmance of bankruptcy court's conditioning of relief from the
stay on parties' consent to agreement under which a contested matter would be tried in state
court), rev. on other grounds, 743 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1984).
132 See, e.g., Frankford Trust Co. v. Dublin Properties (In Re Dublin Properties), 27
Bankr. 506, 506-07 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983)(conditioning of the stay contingent on parties'
execution of a mortgage note); Federal National Mortgage Assoc. v. Cosby (In Re Cosby), 22
Bankr. 682, 683 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982)("[m]odification of the automatic stay may be
conditioned on the [debtor's] payment of reasonable attorneys' fees and other costs as may
be allowed by the court" for the creditor's filing of the motion for relief from the stay);
Imperial Bank v. El Patio, Ltd. (In Re El Patio Ltd.), 6 Bankr. 518 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1980)(continuation of the stay contingent on the debtor's turnover of rents); Ideal Roofing
and Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. M. R. Harrison Constr. Corp. (In Re Ideal Roofing & Sheet
Metal Works, Inc.), 9 Bankr. 2, 3 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980).
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that there is no point in seeking turnover. As stated above, actions taken
in violation of the stay are void and without legal effect. Although the
creditor would have possession of the property, there would be a cloud on
the title which might deter purchasers and title insurers. An annulment
of the stay would go a long way toward alleviating their apprehension. 33
14.400 Substantive Grounds for Granting Relief From the Automatic
Stay
14.410 Definitions
Prior to discussing the merits of granting relief from the stay some
definitions must be provided.
14.411 Amount of the Debt
When relief is sought by a secured party intending to foreclose on
collateral, the amount of the indebtedness must often be established. The
pertinent provision of the Bankruptcy Code is 11 U.S.C. § 506(b):
(b) To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by
property the value of which, after recovery under subsection (c) of
this section, is greater than the amount of such claim, there shall
be allowed to the holder of such claim, interest on such claim, and
any reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided for under the
agreement under which such claim arose.' 34
Note that the language of § 506(b) expressly allows only for certain
charges arising under an agreement. The amount of the debt includes the
outstanding principal debt, interest currently due, and any costs and
attorney fees accorded by the document creating the security interest.135
The reasonable costs of foreclosure likewise increase the amount of the
movant's debt. 136
133 See, e.g., Albany Partners Limited v. Westbrook, (In Re Albany Partners), 749 F.2d
670 (11 Cir. 1984); Rosenfeld v. City of New York (In Re Silverman), 45 Bankr. 892
(S.D.N.Y. 1985)(stay annulled under Bankruptcy Act of 1898); Sundstrom Mortgage Co.,
Inc. v, 2218 Bluebird Limited Partnership (In Re 2218 Bluebird Limited Partnership), 41
Bankr. 540, 543 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1984)(stay annulled after the debtor filed multiple,
successive petitions in bad faith under chapter 11 merely for the purpose of invoking the
automatic stay without an intent or ability to reorganize).
134 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1985).
135 11 U.S.C. § 506(b).
136 Crocker National Bank v. American Mariner Ind., Inc., 724 F.2d 426, at 435 n.12 (9th
Cir. 1984)(the court stated that the expects costs of foreclosure must be adequately
protected); Vlahos v. Pitts (In Re Pitts), 2 Bankr. 476, 478 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1979);
Whitinsville Savings Bank v. Grundstrom (In Re Grundstrom), 14 B.R. 791, 792 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1981); La Jolla Mortgage Fund v. Rancho El Cajon Assoc., 18 B.R. 283, 289 (Bankr.
S.D. Cal. 1982); In Re Colonial Mortgage Service Co. v. Dallasta (In Re Dallasta), 7 Bankr.
883, 885 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980); In Re Polzin, 49 B.R. 370 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985).
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Although not all court's which have construed § 506(b) have spoken on
the point, there is a question as to whether late charges and related
obligations secured under a loan will augment a secured claim when the
loan is oversecured.'13 In Ireson the court held that late charges arising
under a loan are penalties and as such will not increase the amount of a
creditor's secured claim. The rationale was that such charges were not
reasonable and necessary costs but rather penalties. Query whether
reasonable and necessary late charges would be allowable.
Where the interest rate under a mortgage jumps to a higher rate on
default, the court may opt to use the higher rate for the post-default
period in fixing the amount of the debt. 138 In the absence of any provision
in the mortgage expressing a post-default rate of interest, the bankruptcy
court may apply a reasonable post maturity rate.139 That rate may reflect
that a mortgagor who is unable to pay a mortgage at maturity is a greater
risk than one not in default. 140 In federal districts which have not adopted
these positions, it is rationally possible for a court to establish a rule in
all cases that the post-default rate will not vary from the pre-default rate.
Such a rule may even be extended to void any contractually expressed
post-default rate at odds with the pre-default rate. Unmatured interest is
not includable in the indebtedness. 141 Taxes which are accorded a lien on
the property at issue must be considered in fixing the amount of equity in
the property. 142 On a claim for taxes which is secured by property of the
estate, the question is whether the claim is augmented by postpetition
interest, penalties and interest on the penalties. Some courts have
stressed the point mentioned above, that under § 506(b) a secured claim
is augmented by interest, and that any reasonable fees, costs or charges
under a secured claim augment the claim only to the extent those charges
arise under an agreement. Hence, under this view interest and costs
arising under force of statute on nonconsentual liens would not augment
a secured claim. Consequently, under this view when a tax lien attaches
to property of the estate prior to the filing of a petition, postpetition
interest does not augment the secured claim, and in fact, under § 506(b)
it does not accrue.' 43 As a collateral matter, some allowance for payment
of the postpetition accrual of interest on prepetition tax liens may be
137 See, e.g., Ireson v. Matt Financial Corp. (In Re Ireson), 48 Bankr. 711 (Bankr. W.D.
Va. 1985).
18 In re W. S. Sheppley & Co., 45 B.R. 473, 478-79 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984).
'a9 In Re Hempstead Realty Assoc., 47 Bankr. 998, 999 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
140 Bloor v. Hartsdale Assoc., (In Re Hartsdale Assoc.), 452 F. Supp. 67, 69 (S.D.N.Y.
1978).
141 Section 502(b)(2).
142 In Re Kertennis, 40 Bankr. 895, 898 (Bankr. D. R.I. 1984).
143 In Re Boston and Maine Corp. (Appeal of the City of Cambridge), 719 F.2d 493 (1st
Cir. 1983).
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required in a confirmable plan under chapter 13 or 11.14 Prepetition
interest on taxes secured by a lien would augment the secured claim. 145
If an agreement creating a security interest provides for attorneys' fees
as a flat percentage of the principal indebtedness or as a percentage of
some other fixed amount, the indebtedness includes only that portion of
fees attributable to any actual and necessary work performed by the
attorney. 146 The fact that the provision for a fixed percentage rate for
attorneys' fees may be completely allowable under state law is not
binding on the bankruptcy court.147
Of relevant concern is the pertinent date as to which the various
components of the indebtedness are computed. The sounder view holds
that the proper time to compute these components is when the hearing on
relief from the stay is held.148
14.412 Equity and Equity Cushion
The equity of the collateral is the value of the property less the
aggregate sum of all valid encumbrances on the property held by all
creditors.149 If the encumbrances exceed the value of the property, there
is no equity in it. "[T]he'equity cushion' has been defined as value in the
property, above the amount owed to the [movant] with a secured claim,
that will shield that interest from loss due to any decrease in the value of
the property during [the] time the automatic stay remains in effect."'150 If
the property is encumbered by liens or mortgages inferior to those of the
movant, those secured interests are disregarded when calculating the
equity cushion that protects the movant. 151 Superior encumbrances will
decrease the movant's equity cushion.
14 In Re Venable, 48 Bankr. 853, (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
145 Kertennis, 40 Bankr. at 898.
146 First Eastern Bank v. Llewellyn (In Re Llewellyn), 27 Bankr. 481, 482-83 (Bankr.
M.D. Pa. 1983); In Re Baker, 49 Bankr. 240, 242-43 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985); Federal
National Mortgage Assoc. v. Cosby (In Re Cosby), 22 Bankr. 682 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982).
14' Llewellyn, 27 Bankr. at 482-83.
14' Kertennis, 40 Bankr. 898; Imperial Bank v. El Patio, Ltrd. (In Re El Patio, Ltd.), 6
Bankr. 518 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1980); contra La Jolla Mortgage Fund v. Rancho El Cajon
Assoc., 18 Bankr. 283, 287 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982)(holding that petition date is the proper
date).
149 Stewart v. Gurley, 745 F.2d 1194 (9th Cir. 1984); Nazareth National Bank v.
Trina-Dee, Inc., 731 F.2d 170, 171 (3d Cir. 1984).
150 Pistole v. Mellor (In Re Mellor), 734 F.2d 1396, 1400 n.2 (9th Cir. 1984); In Re
Kertennis, 40 Bankr. 895, 898 (Bankr. D. R.I. 1984); La Jolla Mortgage Fund v. Rancho El
Cajon Assoc., 18 Bankr. 283, 287 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982); Commonwealth of Pa. State
Employees' Retirement Fund v. Roane (In Re Roane), 8 Bankr. 997, 1000 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1981), affd 14 Bankr. 542 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
151 Pistole, 734 F.2d 1396; In Re Woodbranch Energy Plaza One, Ltd., 44 Bankr. 733, 736
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1984).
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14.413 Value of Collateral
The value of the collateral is, of course, what it is worth. The simplicity
of this definition is complicated by the fact that on the hearing on the
motion for relief from the automatic stay, the bankruptcy court is free to
choose the standard of valuation to be used in fixing the value of the
property. The standard may be fair market value, going concern value,
distress sale or liquidation value, etc.
152
14.414 Adequate Protection
Some insight into the definition of adequate protection of an interest is
afforded by 11 U.S.C. § 361:
When adequate protection is required under section 362, 363, or
364 of this title of an interest of an entity in property, such
adequate protection may be provided by-
(1) requiring the trustee to make a cash payment or periodic
cash payments to such entity, to the extent that the stay under
section 362 of this title, use, sale, or lease under section 363 of
this title, or any grant of a lien under section 364 of this title
results in a decrease in the value of such entity's interest in such
property;
(2) providing to such entity an additional or replacement lien to
the extent that such stay, use, sale, lease, or grant results in a
decrease in the value of such entity's interest in such property; or
(3) granting such other relief, other than entitling such entity
to compensation allowable under section 503(b)(1) of this title as
an administrative expense, as will result by such entity of the
indubitable equivalent of such entity's interest in such prop-
erty. 153
It provides three nonexhaustive examples of such protection: (1) the
debtor's disbursement of a cash payment or periodic cash payments to the
secured party to the extent that the stay results in a decrease in value of
the secured party's interest in the collateral; (2) the debtor's providing of
an additional or replacement lien to the extent that the stay results in a
decrease in the value of the secured party's interest in the collateral; (3)
and the debtor's granting such other relief as will result in the realization
by the secured creditor of the indubitable equivalent of such entity's
interest in the collateral.
Adequate protection in collateral should not be determined solely by
reference to the lack of an equity cushion but also by the "stability of [the]
152 American Bank and Trust Co. v. Ram Mfg. Inc., (In Re Ram Mfg., Inc.), 32 Bankr. 969
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983).
153 Section 506(b).
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collateral ... likelihood of reorganization and . . credibility of [the]
debtor's protection plan."'15
4
Where adequate protection has been offered to a secured creditor and
that protection later proves inadequate, the creditor is entitled to a
superpriority administrative expense to the extent of the insufficiency. 155
The insufficiency is gauged, through hindsight, by equitable consider-
ations.156
The debtor's payment of rent on a leasehold, plus a security deposit,
may constitute adequate protection of the lessor's interest in the
leasehold. 157
At least one case, Big Bear Super Market No. 3 v. Princess Baking
Corp.,158 has held that a creditor with a right of setoff is entitled to
adequate protection of that right and in the absence of such protection the
stay was modified. This author believes that a result contradictory to
Princess would also be a rational alternative in deciding the matter.
14.420 The Merits of Obtaining Relief Under Subsection 362(d)(1)
14.421 Lack of Adequate Protection Under Subsection 362(d)(1)
The most common type of request for relief from the automatic stay is
brought by a mortgagee seeking to foreclose on the encumbered collateral
which is property of the bankruptcy estate. Under appropriate facts relief
may be granted under either § 362(d)(1) or (d)(2). As stated above, relief
under § 362(d)(1) may be granted "for cause, including the lack of
adequate protection of an interest in property' of the party moving for
relief. Note that lack of adequate protection is merely one basis for cause
under § 362(d)(5) and that other "causes" may be successfully ad-
vanced.159
Relief from the stay due to a lack of adequate protection may be
granted only if the movant has an "interest in property" and that interest
is not being "adequate[ly] protect[ed]." Approaching the first prong of this
test, it appears that an "interest in property" described in § 362(d)(1) is
the same type of property interest that is protected by the Fifth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution. 160 It is clear that the interest of
154 In Re W.S. Sheppley & Co., 45 Bankr. 473, 480 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984); Philadelphia
Consumer Discount Co. v. Commercial Credit Business Loans, Inc. (In Re Philadelphia
Consumer Discount Co.), 37 Bankr. 946 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
155 11 U.S.C. § 507(b); In Re Mutschler, 45 Bankr. 494,496 (Bankr. N. Dak. 1984); In Re
Callister, 15 Bankr. 521, 525-30 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981).
15 Mutschler, 45 Bankr. at 497.
157 City Stores Co. v. A.L.S., Inc. (In Re A.L.S., Inc,), 3 Bankr. 107 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980).
' Big Bear Super Market No. 3 v. Princess Baking Corp. (In Re Princess Banking
Corp.), 5 Bankr. 587 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980).
159 See infra text accompanying notes 173-190.
160 S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 5787, 5835.
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a lienor or co-owner in property is the type of interest needing protec-
tion.16' Lessors and bailors would typically have interests in property
requiring adequate protection. As is similarly apparent, creditors holding
nothing more than an unsecured obligation against the debtor are not
holding an interest in property within the meaning of § 362(d)(1).162 More
unusual types of interests in property may be subject to a need for
different degrees of adequate protection.
163
Under the second prong of the test, the interest in property addressed
in § 362(d)(1) must be protected against erosion in value which cannot be
mitigated by the creditor due to his inability to act in the face of the
automatic stay.164 Thus, the creditor is entitled to the value of his bargain
and should receive the same measure of protection afforded prior to the
filing of the bankruptcy petition although he may not get the same type
of protection he had previously received. Voiced another way the question
is, "What must the debtor adequately protect?" The Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit in Crocker National Bank v. American Mariner Ind.,
Inc.,'6 5 answered that the debtor must adequately protect "the present
value of the secured creditor's interest" in the collatal.166 What the courts
apparently rejected were findings by the bankruptcy courts of adequate
protection even though the secured creditor was undersecured and
receiving no periodic payments, while the value of the collateral was
static or depreciating. In such a situation the secured creditor was not
accruing interest on his secured claim and that failure was apparently
the basis for finding a lack of adequate protection. The courts in
American Mariner and Tandem Mining rejected another line of authority
which extended "adequate protection to the value of the collateral
alone.' 67 At least with regard to secured claims which are undersecured,
there is no equity cushion to afford adequate protection, and thus the
debtor must provide some other means of protection, such as through
periodic payments of interest to the creditor on the portion of the claim
which is secured. As stated above, American Mariner and Tandem
161 Id.
162 In Re Garland Corp., 6 Bankr. 456, 463 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980); cf. Louisville Joint
Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 588 (1935)("It is true that the position of a
secured creditor who has rights in specific property differes fundamentally from that of an
unsecured creditor, who has none.").
163 Bankers Life Ins. Co. of Neb. v. Alyucan Interstate Corp. (In Re Alyucan Interstate
Corp.), 12 Bankr. 803 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981).
164 Alyucan, 12 Bankr. at 808.
166 Crocker National Bank v. American Mariner Ind., Inc., 734 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1984).
166 American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 434, 435; Accord Grundy Nat'l Bank v. Tandem
Mining Corp., 754 F.2d 1436 (4th Cir. 1985); Republic Bank of Houston, N.A. v. Bear Creek
Mini Storage, Inc. (In Re Bear Creek Mini Storage, Inc.), 49 Bankr. 454 (Bankr. S.D. Text.
1985).
17 American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 434.
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Mining rejected a contrary line of authority. That dismissed view is aptly
summarized as follows:
[A]dequate protection relates to maintaining the status-quo dur-
ing the period after the filing of the petition and before confirma-
tion or rejection of the plan. The secured creditor is entitled to
protection against any depreciation or diminution in the value of
the collateral as it existed and was available to satisfy the debt on
the date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. 168
Although not expressed in American Mariner or Tandem Mining, a
secured claim which is oversecured would continue to accrue interest,
late charges and attorney fees by attribution of those charges to the
unencumbered portion of the collateral or to that portion of the collateral
encumbered by creditors would hold encumbrances inferior to that of the
movant. 169 Although the movant might not be receiving current pay-
ments, at least his secured claim would be continually augmented by
interest, late charges, etc. Thus, if a secured creditor is oversecured,
American Mariner and Tandem Mining probably should not apply.170
A § 362(d)(1) mortgagee often urges that the equity cushion in the
property does not adequately protect his security interest. If the equity
cushion is large enough, this alone may provide adequate protection. 171 If
the cushion is not large enough or is nonexistent and if appreciation in
the value of the property is not exceeding any accretion of debt, interest,
late charges and attorneys' fees, then relief from the stay should be
granted due to the lack of adequate protection unless the debtor gives the
creditor some other form of adequate protection such as a lien on another
parcel of realty.172
14.422 Other Bases "For Cause" Under 11 U.S.C. Subsection
362(d)(1)
"Because there is no clear definition of what constitutes 'cause,' [under
§ 362(d)(1)] discretionary relief from the stay must be determined on a
case by case basis."' 73
The legislative history and the case law state several possible "causes":
Undoubtedly the court will lift the stay for proceedings before
specialized or nongovernmental tribunals to allow those proceed-
1 U.S. v. Smithfield Estates, Inc. (In Re Smithfield Estates, Inc.), 48 Bankr. 910, 914
(Bankr. D. R.I. 1985)(cites omitted).
169 Section 506(b); Bear Creek, 49 Bankr. at 456.
170 Bear Creek, 49 Bankr. at 456.
171 Pistole, 734 F.2d 1400.
172 American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 430; § 361.
173 MacDonald v. MacDonald, (In Re MacDonald) 755 F.2d 715, 717 (9th Cir. 1985).
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ings to come to a conclusion. Any party desiring to enforce an
order in such a proceeding would thereafter have to come before
the bankruptcy court to collect assets. Nevertheless, it will often
be more appropriate to permit proceedings to continue in their
place of origin, when no great prejudice to the bankruptcy estate
would result, in order to leave the parties to their chosen forum
and to relieve the bankruptcy court from many duties that may
be handled elsewhere. 174
Other causes might include the lack of any connection with or
interference with the pending bankruptcy case. Generally, pro-
ceedings in which the debtor is a fiduciary, or involving postpeti-
tion activities of the debtor, need not be stayed because they bear
no relationship to the purpose of the automatic stay, which is
protection of the debtor and his estate from his creditors. 175
A divorce or child custody proceeding including the debtor may bear no
relation to the bankruptcy case and in those cases the stay should be
modified.176 "It is appropriate for bankruptcy courts to avoid incursions
into family law matters 'out of consideration of court economy, judicial
restraint, and deference to our state court brethren and their established
expertise in such matters."1 77 Furthermore, "[b]ankruptcy courts should
be reluctant to entertain questions which may be equally well resolved
elsewhere."' 7 Relief may be granted to allow only a portion of a law suit
to proceed, such as discovery, rather than the entire suit, but such relief
174 H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 341 (1977), S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2nd
Sess. 50 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5836, 6297.
175 S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5838.
176 H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 343 (1977), reprinted in, 1978 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 5787, 6300.
177 MacDonald at 716-17 quoting Beauchamp v. Graham (In Re Graham), 14 Bankr. 246,
248 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1981). See also Howard v. Howard (In Re Howard), 27 Bankr. 894,
895-96 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983)(bankruptcy court granted relief from the automatic stay to
debtor's ex-wife, who had alleged that the property settlement was fraudulently induced);
cf. Schulze v. Schulze, 15 Bankr. 106, 109 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981)(the court granted the
debtor's wife relief from the automatic stay in order to complete state proceedings for
divorce, child custody, and property division).
178 Uranga v. Geib (In Re Paso Del Norte Oil Co.), 755 F.2d 421, 425 (5th Cir.
1985)(quoting First State Bank & Trust Co. v. Sand Springs State Bank, 528 F.2d 350, 354
(10th Cir. 1976)); See also In Re Curtis, 40 Bankr. 795 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984)(collecting
cases on whether the bankruptcy court should grant relief from the stay to allow litigation
to proceed in another forum); See also Holtkamp v. Littlefield (In Re Holtkamp), 669 F.2d
505 (7th Cir. 1982)(relief from the stay is properly granted to allow the plaintiff in a
personal injury suit to litigate the debtor's liability in state court).
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may be denied on the basis that it would hinder the economical admin-
istration of the estate. 179
Another basis for granting relief from the stay "for cause" that some
courts have recognized under § 362(d)(1), is the failure of the debtor to
make the requisite periodic payments as provided under a document
creating the security interest in the collateral at issue. 180 Payments
which have been missed either prepetition or postpetition are pertinent
in deciding whether relief should be granted on this basis, but the
postpetition payments are the most relevant. A review by the court of all
pertinent factors is necessary in order to determine whether relief should
be granted. For instance, if the debtor has purchased and encumbered a
parcel of realty three months prior to the filing of the petition, with the
debtor missing two prepetition payments and three postpetition pay-
ments, the court would be more inclined to grant relief from the stay than
if the debtor had missed six monthly postpetition payments after having
faithfully paid on the mortgage for the preceeding ten years. The debtor's
failure to provide insurance on encumbered property may also provide
"cause" under § 362(d)(1). 1' 1
The initiation by the debtor of an action, such as a law suit, against
which the movant wishes to interpose a counterclaim that would other-
wise be barred by § 362(a), may generally be a basis for cause. 8 2
The debtor's abuse of the bankruptcy laws may likewise provide cause
as may the debtor's misconduct and bad faith.' 8 3
17 In Re Towner Petroleum Co., 48 Bankr. 182, 190 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1985).
180 See Royal Bank, Inc. v. Three Tuns, Inc. (In Re Three Tuns, Inc.), 35 Bankr. 110
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983); Ukrainian Say. and Loan Assoc. v. Trident Corp., 22 Bankr. 491
(E.D. Pa. 1982); In Re Tainan, 48 Bankr. 250, 252 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985).
181 See In Re Heinzeroth, 40 Bankr. 518, 520 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984); Loof v. Frankford
Trust Co. (In Re Loof), 41 Bankr. 855, 856 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984)(lack of insurance on
property is a lack of adequate protection in a takeover proceeding).
,' See Bohack Corp. v. Borden, Inc. (In Re Bohack Corp.) 599 F.2d 1160, 1168 (2d Cir.
1979)(decided under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898).
183 See In Re Augustus Court Assoc., 43 Bankr. 352, 354 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984); In Re
Victory Constr. Co., 9 Bankr. 549, 560 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981)(by Ordin, B.J.)(exhaustive
discussion of lack of "good faith," as well as a collection of grounds "for cause" in granting
relief from the stay under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898) (vacated as moot, see Hadley v.
Victory Constr. Co., (In Re Victory Constr. Co.)), 37 Bankr. 222 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1984). See
also Fazio v. Alan Sinton, Ltd. (In Re Fazio), 41 Bankr. 865, 867 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1984)(misconduct and bad faith). See also California Mortgage Serv. v. Yukon Enters., Inc.
(In Re Yukon Enters., Inc.), 39 Bankr. 919, 921-22 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1984)(debtor's bad
faith in filing under the Bankruptcy Code was a basis for finding "cause" under 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(d)(1) 1982). See also Assoc. Commercial Corp. v. G. Y. Trucking, Inc. (In Re G. Y.
Trucking Inc.), 28 Bankr. 59, 61 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1982)(lack of good faith due to debtor's
failure to allow secured creditor to inspect collateral).
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Shuffling of assets from one legal entity to another immediately prior
to the filing of a petition under the Bankruptcy Code may constitute bad
faith and will be "cause" under § 362(d)(1) in some cases. 184
When the movant wishes to setoff its mutual obligations with the
debtor, the mere existence of those mutual obligations represents a prima
facie case for cause for relief from the automatic stay in a Chapter 7
case. 1 5 In a Chapter 11 case this prima facie basis for relief is not present
since many other factors must be considered such as the debtor's need for
payment on the creditor's obligation to fund the debtor's operations.' 8 6
One court has held that a creditor with a right of setoff is entitled to
adequate protection of that right and, in the absence of such protection,
the stay should be modified.'87
A prepetition lapse of a lease of the debtor/lessee is sufficient "cause"
under §362(d)(1) to modify the automatic stay apparently due to a lack of
adequate protection. 8 8
The mere filing of a petition under the Bankruptcy Code is not cause
under § 362(d)(1) notwithstanding the fact that such an event is a breach
of a contract.189
Relief from the stay on request of a secured party cannot be based on
the fact that the discharge will extinguish the debtor's in personarn
liability on the debt. 190
14.430 Relief Under Subsection 362(d)(2)
14.431 Subsection 362(d)(2) Generally
A secured creditor seeking to foreclose may also successfully seek relief
from the stay under § 362(d)(2) if he can prove that there is no equity in
the property, and that the property is not necessary for an effective
"s See California Mortgage Serv. v. Yukon Enters., Inc. (In Re Yukon Enters., Inc.) 39
Bankr. 919 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1984)(transfer of assets to a new corporation which decreased
the debtor's chances of reorganization was basis for relief under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1). See
also Myers v. The Beach Club (In Re The Beach Club), 22 Bankr. 597 (Bankr. N.D. Cal.
1982)(filing of a petition by a newly formed limited partnership does not constitute bad faith
in light of legitimate business reasons and lack of injury to moving creditor).
18I See In Re Flanagan Bros., 47 Bankr. 299, 303 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1985); Waste
Management v. Barry Parker's, Inc. (In Re Barry Parker's, Inc.) 33 Bankr. 115 (M.D. Tenn.
1983). See also In Re Sound Emporium, Inc., 48 Bankr. 1 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1984)(set-off
subordinated U.S. tax debt against a claim the debtor owed to the U.S. army was a sufficient
basis for granting relief from the stay to allow set-off in a Chapter 7 case).
lar Flanagan Bros., Inc. at 303 n.9.
187 Big Bear Super Market No. 3 v. Princess Baking Corp. (In Re Princess Banking
Corp.), 5 Bankr. 587, 590 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980).
les In Re 163rd Street Medical Corp., 47 Bankr. 869, 871 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985).
159 Riggs Natl. Bank v. Perry (In Re Perry), 729 F.2d 982, 984-85 (4th Cir. 1984).
19 See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Sawyer (In Re Sawyer), 18 Bankr. 661
(Bankr. D. Idaho 1982); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Abel (In Re Abel), 17 Bankr.
424, 426 (D. Mary. 1981).
19861
41Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1986
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
reorganization. Under Chapter 7 there is no reorganization intended, and
thus the creditor need only prove that there is no equity in the property.
Under Chapter 11 both elements under § 362(d)(2) must be proved.
14.432 Applicability of Subsection 362(d)(2)(B) in Chapter 13
Under Chapter 13 there is a split of authority as to whether a movant
must prove whether § 362(d)(2) is applicable under that chapter, and, if
so, whether the presence of § 362(d)(2)(B) must be proved or whether it is
superfluous. 191 This author believes the sounder view is that § 362(d)(2)
applies in Chapter 13, and that after the creditor proves that there is no
equity in the property, the debtor bears the burden of proving the
property is necessary to an effective reorganization.
14.433 Property Necessary to an Effective Reorganization
Under § 362(d)(2)(B) proof that the property is necessary to an effective
reorganization requires a showing that there is a reasonable possibility of
reorganization within a reasonable time.19 2 One court has held that the
focus should be on whether the property in question can make an
"identifiable contribution" to a debtor's reorganization regardless of
whether a Chapter 11 "liquidation or rehabilitation" is intended.' 93
Another court has held that the property must be "critical" to the
reorganization.194 At least one other court has stated that, "[p]roperty is
necessary for an effective reorganization'whenever it is necessary either
in the operation of the business or in a plan to further the interests of
interests of the estate through rehabilitation or liquidation."" 195 The
debtor's failure to prove a "reasonable possibility of a reorganization"
' See, e.g., Vieland v. First Fed. Say. Bank (In Re Vieland), 41 Bankr. 134, 142 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1984)(§ 362(d)(2) is applicable in Chapter 13 and proof on § 362(d)(2)(B) is
required by the debtor to thwart relief under § 362(d)(2)); Dale Funding Corp. v. Garner (In
Re Garner), 18 Bankr. 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)(§ 362(d)(2) applies in Chapter 13); Roosevelt
Say. Bank v. Branch (In Re Branch), 10 Bankr. 227 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981)(§ 362(d)(2)(B)
not applicable in Chapter 13); First Fed. Say. of Austin v. Crouse (In Re Crouse), 9 Bankr.
400 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1981)(§ 362(d)(2) applies in Chapter 13); Fidelity Bond and Mortgage
Co. v. McAloon (In Re McAloon), 1 Bankr. 766 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980)(assumed applicability
of § 362(d)(2) to Chapter 13); Citizens and Southern Natl. Bank v. Feimster (In Re
Feimster), 3 Bankr. 11, 13-14 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1979)(11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) 1982) not
applicable in Chapter 13).
192 Terra Mar Dev. Corp. v. Terra Mar Assoc. (In Re Terra Mar Assoc.), 3 Bankr. 462
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1980).
'9a In Re Greiman, 45 Bankr. 574, 580 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984).
'9 In Re Hutton, 45 Bankr. 558, 561 (Bankr. N.D. 1984); See also Nazareth National
Bank and Trust Co. v. Trina-Dee, Inc. (In Re Trina-Dee, Inc.) 26 Bankr. 152 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1983); Barclays Bank of New York v. Saypol (In Re Saypol), 31 B.R. 796 (Bankr. S.D.
N.Y. 1983).
' In Re Keller, 45 Bankr. 469, 472 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984) (quoting Empire, Inc. v.
Koopmans (In Re Koopmans), 22 Bankr. 395, 407 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982)).
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cannot be predicated solely on the debtor's failure to file a plan, but such
failure coupled with an unreasonable lapse of time would promote a
different result.196 If there can be no effective reorganization, the prop-
erty is not considered necessary.'9 7
In the early stages of a Chapter 11 case the court should balance the
interests of the secured creditor against the congressional policy favoring
reorganization. "The court should be hesitant to find no reasonable
possibility of reorganization especially where the debtor has not had
sufficient time to formulate a plan."198
14.434 11 U.S.C. §362(d)(2)(B) and Liquidating Plans
The applicability of § 362(d)(2)(B) in conjunction with a liquidating
plan of reorganization has presented some confusion. Under the Bank-
ruptcy Code the court may approve a Chapter 11 plan which proposes the
liquidation of the debtor's estate rather than its continuation as an
on-going concern.' 9 9 Although § 362(d)(2)(B) ostensibly applies to re-
quests for relief from the stay when liquidation of the assets is proposed
in the Chapter 11 plan, the court will probably apply this provision
somewhat differently when a liquidating plan is intended rather than a
reorganization plan. The first of two reasons for this is that granting or
denying relief from the stay on the basis of § 362(d)(2)(B) when liquida-
tion is proposed, is largely a question of who gets to sell the collateral, the
debtor or the secured creditor. The same result is contemplated. The
greater the similarity between the two forms of disposition, the greater
the likelihood the court will grant relief from the stay. Second, the
legislative policy behind Chapter 11 reorganizations, part of which is
reflected in § 362(d)(2)(B), is that reorganization preserves the going-
concern value of the business. A liquidating plan typically would not
preserve this value, and if not, the court would also be more inclined to
grant relief from the stay. Thus, when a liquidating plan is proposed in
Chapter 11, § 362(d)(2)(B) affords the debtor the greatest assurance of a
denial of a motion for relief from the stay under § 362(d)(2), when the
debtor can prove that the foreclosure sale of the collateral by the creditor
following relief from the stay would be essentially different from the sale
proposed under the plan. The debtor must further prove that the sale
under the plan will preserve some going-concern value of the business
that would be lost in a foreclosure sale by the creditor.
1 In Re Hutton, 45 Bankr. 558, 561 (Bankr. D. N.D. 1984).
197 In Re Woodbranch Energy Plaza One, Ltd., 44 Bankr. 733, 737 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
1984).
19' United States v. Hollie (In Re Hollie), 42 Bankr. 111, 118 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1984); In
Re Heatron, Inc, 6 Bankr. 493 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1980).
199 Section 1123(b)(4) (1982).
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14.435 Use of 11 U.S.C. §362(d)(2) When the Debtor has no
Ownership Interest in the Property
Under § 362(d)(2) a query is posed as to whether this provision may be
used for any stay under § 362(a), "with respect to a stay of an act against
property .... ."20 The question was raised without resolution in dicta on
an action for relief from the automatic stay initiated by a lessor of realty.
The court stated:
Although a leasehold entails the use of property, § 362(d)(2) was
apparently drafted with an eye toward property in which the
debtor had some right of ownership, rather than a mere right of
use, as evinced by the term "equity" in that provision. The notion
of an equity interest in the typical leasehold is at odds with our
understanding of the term. If our perception is correct, either §
362(d)(2) cannot be used by a landlord to retake his leasehold or
the provision is applicable in such a situation with proof neces-
sary only on element § 362(d)(2)(B) since § 362(d)(2)(A) would
necessarily be met.201
14.500 Burden of Proof
Section 362(g) states as follows:
(g) In any hearing under subsection (d) or (e) of this section
concerning relief from the stay or any act under subsection (a) of
this section-
(1) the party requesting such relief has the burden of proof on
the issue of the debtor's equity in property; and
(2) the party opposing such relief has the burden of proof on all
other issues. 20 2
Under § 362(g) the party requesting relief from the automatic stay has
the burden of proof on the issue of the debtor's equity in the property. 20 3
To establish the equity the creditor must introduce proof on the value of
the property at issue as well as the amount of all encumbrances on it. The
party opposing relief from the stay has the burden of proof of all other
issues other than the equity in the property. 0 4 The burden of proof under
§ 362(d)(1) is allocated by § 362(g)(2) on the debtor, but that burden is at
odds with the statement under § 362(d)(1) that the court may grant relief
from the stay "for cause." Section § 362(g)(2) ostensibly imposes on the
200 Section 362(d)(2).
201 Roslyn Savings Bank v. Comcoach Corp. (In Re Comcoach Corp.), 19 Bankr. 231, 233
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982). See also In Re Law Clinic of Mott & Gray, P.C., 39 Bankr. 73
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984).
212 Section 362(g).
203 Section 362(g)(1).
204 Section 362(g)(2).
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debtor the burden of establishing that "cause" does not exist for granting
relief from the stay without first imposing on the moving creditor the
duty of showing that cause is present. This anomoly has been highlighted
by a few cases. See, e.g., Clark Equipment Credit Co. v. Kane (In Re
Kane).205 In Kane the court held that a party requesting relief under §
362(d)(1) bears the burden of establishing "cause" for that relief and
stated that:
[S]ection [§ 362(d)(1)] imposes the substantive requirement of
'cause' on a party who seeks relief from the stay. In our system of
law the party requesting relief from a court typically bears the
burden of meeting such substantive prerequisites to relief.
Arthur v. Unkart, 96 U.S. 118, 122 (1877).... To the extent that
the cause requirement of § 362(d)(1) may be at odds with the
allocation of the burden of proof of § 362(g), we believe that the
substantive requirement of § 362(d)(1) controls.2° 6
Although this author believes that the view espoused in Kane is the
better reasoned position, most courts apparently have not been con-
fronted with the discussed anomaly, and apply the burden of proof as
allocated by § 362(g). In practice this theoretical schism typically seems
to have little bearing on the outcome of most motions for relief from the
stay.
14.600 Relief from the Stay when the Estate
Consists of a Single Asset of Realty
When the estate consists of merely one parcel of realty the basis for
relief from the stay may be granted under § 362(d)(1) or (d)(2) in the same
manner that relief could be sought in a multiple asset case. The reason for
emphasizing this "non-statement" is that the legislative history of the
Bankruptcy Code reflects provisions of an unenacted bill which would
have treated such single asset cases differently. The history states in
pertinent part as follows:
Upon the court's finding that the debtor has no equity in the
property subject to the stay and that the property is not necessary
to an effective reorganization of the debtor, [§ 362(d)(2)] requires
o See, e.g., In Re Towner Petroleum Co., 48 Bankr. 182, 191 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1985);
First Agricultural Bank v. Jug End in the Berkshires (In Re Jug End in the Berkshires), 46
Bankr. 892,900 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985); InRe Borchers, 45 Bankr. 69, 72 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa
1984); In Re Augustus Court Assoc., 43 Bankr. 352,354 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984); In Re Irving
A. Horns Farms, Inc., 42 Bankr. 832, 837 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984); In Re Curtis, 40
Bankr. 795, 801-03 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984); Clark Equip. Credit Co. v. Kane (In Re Kane),
27 Bankr. 902, 903-05 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1983); City Stores Co. v. A.L.S., Inc.(In Re A.L.S.,
Inc.), 3 Bankr. 107, 108 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980).
20' Clark Equip. Credit Co. v. Kane, 27 Bankr. 902, 904 (1983).
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[that] the court grant relief from the stay. To aid in this
determination, guidelines are established where the property
subject to the stay is real property. An exception to "the necessary
to an effective reorganization" requirement is made for real
property on which no business is being conducted other than
operating the real property and activities incident thereto. The
intent of this exception is to reach the single-asset apartment
type cases which involve primarily tax-shelter investments and
for which the bankruptcy laws have provided a too facile method
to relay [delay?] conditions .... 207
The proposed statutory language to implement this notion was embraced
by S. 2266, 95 Cong., 2d Sess. § 362, 1978 in the following language: "For
the purpose of this subsection (d) [proposed § 362(d)], property is not
necessary to an effective reorganization of the debtor if it is real property
on which no business is being conducted by the debtor other than the
business of operating the real property and activities incidental
thereto."20 8 The concept was not ultimately adopted into law. This
deviation was implicitly, although correctly, identified in In Re W.S.
Sheppley & Co.209
14.700 Scope of the Order Granting Relief from the Stay
The scope of an order granting relief from the stay is determined by the
language of the order granting such relief. Nonetheless, orders granting
such relief are occasionally ambiguous. Thus, the difficulty in such
situations is in establishing the intent of the judge who granted the relief.
In the same manner that guidelines have developed around the propriety
of granting relief from the stay in certain types of instances, these
guidelines are aids in interpreting the scope of the order granting relief
from the stay.
Since the automatic stay is one of the primary benefits of filing a
petition in bankruptcy, and one in which Congress has broadly favored
the debtor, policy dictates that a modification of the stay should not be
any broader than necessary to relief the creditor seeking that relief from
the hardship he suffers because of the stay. Thus, as a principle in
interpreting the scope of an order granting relief from the stay, this
author believes that such orders are typically granted in favor of the
movants seeking that relief, and are limited to a particular course of
207 S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 52-53 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 5787, 5838-839.
201 S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 362 (1978).
209 See In Re W.S. Sheppley & Co., 45 Bankr. 473,480 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984). Contra,
Riggs Natil. Bank of Washington, D.C. v. Perry, 729 F.2d 982 (4th Cir. 1984)(dicta implicitly
adopting unenacted provision of law).
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conduct sought by those movants. Consequently, a court may grant a
motion for relief filed by a superior encumbrance holder so he may
foreclose on the subject property, but such an order would typically not
terminate the stay as to all entities. A "portion" of that stay would still
remain extant and protect the property from the advances of other
creditors. 210
15.000 AUTOMATIC TERMINATION OF ASPECTS OF THE
STAY WITHOUT FILING IN COURT FOR SUCH RELIEF
At § 362(c) the Bankruptcy Code states:
(c) Except as provided in subsections (d), (e), and (f) of this section-
(1) the stay of an act against property of the estate under
subsection (a) of this section continues until such property is no
longer property of the estate; and
(2) the stay of any other act under subsection (a) of this section
continues until the earliest of-
(A) the time the case is closed;
(B) the time the case is dismissed; or
(C) if the case is a case under chapter 7 of this title concerning
an individual or a case under chapter 9, 11, or 13 of this title, the
time a discharge is granted or denied.211
The Bankruptcy Code provides for the automatic termination of the
automatic stay under § 362(c). The statute draws a distinction between
"an act against property of the estate: and "any other act" stayed by §
362(a). 212 The stay of an act against property of the estate continues until
the property is no longer property of the estate.213 Under this provision,
a further distinction must be drawn between property of the estate and
property of the debtor. Property of the estate ceases having that character
if it is abandoned by the debtor or the trustee, sold, exempted by the
debtor, or otherwise administered under the Bankruptcy Code.214
The stay of any act other than an act against property of the estate
continues until: 1) the case is closed; 2) the case is dismissed; or 3) if the
case is a case under Chapter 7 concerning an individual, or a case under
Chapter 9, 11 or 13, the time a discharge is granted or denied.215
A very common but mistaken view is that the automatic stay ends
210 See In Re Saint Peter's School, 26 Bankr. 589, 591 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983)(where a
senior encumbrance holder obtained relief from the stay to foreclose on property, a junior
lien holder was not thereby also released from the constraints of the stay). See also Franklin
Fed. Say. & Loan Assoc. v. Ripianzi (In Re Ripianzi), 27 Bankr. 15 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1982).
211 Section 362(c).
212 Section 362(c); See In Re Ripianzi at 16.
213 Section 362(c)(1).
214 11 U.S.C. § 554(d).
215 Section 362(c)(2).
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automatically on the entry of the debtor's discharge. This perspective
fails to account for § 362(c)(1). On the granting or denying of the
discharge, the automatic stay is not thereby terminated as to acts against
property of the estate.216
Futhermore, when property of the estate is abandoned, creditors are
not necessarily free to act against that property since some aspects of the
stay may still be extant, e.g., if the debtor has an interest in the property,
the stay bars acts against that interest. An abandonment of an item of
property plus a grant or denial for discharge terminates the stay in all
respects as to the property abandoned. 217
16.000 DISMISSAL OF THE BANKRUPTCY CASE TERMINATES THE STAY
The dismissal of a bankruptcy case generally revests-the property of
the estate in the entity in which such property was vested immediately
prior to the commencement of bankruptcy.2 18 Under § 362(c) the auto-
matic stay is viewed as having two aspects: (1) "the stay of an act against
property of the estate"; and (2) "the stay of any other act."219 Under the
first aspect of the stay described in § 362(c)(1), the stay ends when
property is no longer property of the estate. 220 Such a result is effected
through § 349(b)(3) on dismissal. The second aspect of the stay termi-
nates, inter alia, on dismissal according to the terms of 362(c)(2)(B). Thus,
the stay is terminated in all respects when a case is dismissed.
17.000 TERMINATION OF AN ASPECT OF THE AUTOMATIC
STAY ATER A LAPSE OF TIME FOLLOWING
A REQUEST FOR RELIEF FROM THE STAY
The provisions of § 362(e) are as follows:
(e) Thirty days after a request under subsection (d) of this
section for relief from the stay of any act against property of the
estate under subsection (a) of this section, such stay is terminated
with respect to the party in interest making such request, unless
the court, after notice and a hearing, orders such stay continued
in effect pending the conclusion of, or as a result of, a final
hearing and determination under subsection (d) of this section. A
hearing under this subsection may be a preliminary hearing, or
21 Section 362(c)(1)-(2); See also, In Re Ripianzi at 15.
217 See Hickman v. First State Bank of Cordele (In Re Motley), 10 Bankr. 141 (Bankr.
M.D. Ga. 1981); In Re Cruseturner, 8 Bankr. 581 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981); In Re Tummillo,
14 Bankr. 736 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981); Berry v. Dial Consumer Discount Co. (In Re Berry),
11 Bankr. 886 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1981).
213 11 U.S.C. § 349(b)(3) (1982).
"9 Section 362(c)(1)-(2), respectively.
220 Section 362(c)(1).
[Vol. 34:567
48https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol34/iss4/6
AUTOMATIC STAY IN BANKRUPTCY
may be consolidated with the final hearing under subsection (d) of
this section. The court shall order such stay continued in effect
pending the conclusion of the final hearing under subsection (d) of
this section if there is a reasonable likelihood that the party
opposing relief from such stay will prevail at the conclusion of
such final hearing. If the hearing under this subsection is a
preliminary hearing, then such final hearing shall be commenced
not later than thirty days after the conclusion of such preliminary
hearing.221
Also relevant is Bankruptcy Rule 4001(b) which states as follows: "(b)
Final hearing on Stay. The stay of any act against property of the estate
under § 362(a) of the Code expires 30 days after a final hearing is
commenced pursuant to § 362(e)(2) unless within that time the court
denies the motion for relief from the stay."222 Under § 362(e) thirty days
after a request is made under § 362(d) for relief from the stay of an act
against property of the estate, such stay is terminated with respect to the
party requesting the relief, unless the court, after notice and hearing,
orders the stay continued pending the conclusion of, or as a result of, a
final hearing and determination under § 362(d). The hearing required
under § 362(e) may be a preliminary hearing or may be consolidated with
the final hearing under § 362(d). The court must continue the stay
pending the conclusion of the final hearing under § 362(d) if there is a
reasonable likelihood that the party opposing relief from the stay will
prevail at the conclusion of the final hearing. If the hearing under §
362(e) is a preliminary hearing, then the final hearing must be com-
menced not later than thirty days after the conclusion of the preliminary
hearing.
Several points are noteworthy under § 362(e). The first is that it only
accords termination of the stay as to requests for relief from the stay of
acts against property of the estate. As discussed above, § 362(c) illumi-
nates the dichotomy under § 362(a) between acts against property of the
estate and all other acts. Thus it appears that the automatic termination
provisions of § 362(e) leave intact the stay of all acts other than acts
against property of the estate. The stay of acts against the debtor and acts
against property of the debtor would remain unaffected. 223
The time scheme in § 362(e) and Bankruptcy Rule 4001 (b) provides
that the stay of an act against property of the estate lapses thirty days
after a request for relief from the stay unless the court orders the stay
continued after notice and a hearing. Thus, some hearing on the matter,
typically a preliminary hearing, must be held within thirty days after the
221 Section 362(c).
222 BANKR. R. 4001(b).
223 Sections 362(a)(1), (2), (5), (6), (8).
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filing of the motion.224 Within thirty days after a preliminary hearing the
court must commence the final hearing.225 Within thirty days after the
commencement of such a hearing the stay lapses unless the court makes
a final determination to deny the motion.226 Subject to court approval, the
parties may, of course, agree to continue the stay beyond the limits
imposed by § 362(e) and Bankruptcy Rule 4001(b). Without agreement by
the parties, the maximum allowable time for deciding a question on
modifying the stay of an act against property of the estate is ninety days
if there is both a preliminary hearing and a final hearing. If both
hearings are consolidated, the maximum time, absent the parties' con-
sent, is sixty days. Some courts have held that under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a)
the court may extend these time periods.
Numerous courts have held that the bankruptcy court has the power to
extend the stay under Bankruptcy Rule 7065 (incorporating by reference
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65) or 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) although the stay has lapsed, or
will lapse, under § 362(3).227
18.000 Ex PARTE RELIEF FROM THE STAY
Ex parte relief from the stay may be granted under § 362(f) which
states:
(f) Upon request of a party in interest, the court, with or without
a hearing, shall grant such relief from the stay provided under
subsection (a) of this section as is necessary to prevent irrepara-
ble damage to the interest of an entity in property, if such interest
will suffer such damage before there is an opportunity for notice
and a hearing under subsection (d) or (e) of this section. 228
Also relevant is Bankruptcy Rule 4001(c):
(c) Ex Parte Relief From the Stay. Relief from a stay under §
362(a) may be granted without prior notice to the adverse party
only if (1) it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit
or by a verified motion that immediate and irreparable injury,
loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party
or his attorney can be heard in opposition, and (2) the movant's
attorney certified to the court in writing the efforts, if any, which
224 Section 362(e).
225 Section 362(e).
226 BANKS. R. 4001(b).
227 See Explorer Drilling Co., Inc. v. Martin Exploration Co. (In Re Martin Exploration
Co.), 731 F.2d 1210, 1214 (5th Cir. 1984); Navajo Tribe v. Sandmar Corp. (In Re Sandmar
Corp.), 16 Bankr. 120, 122 (Bankr. D. N.M. 181); Citizens and S. Natl. Bank v. Feimster (In
Re Feimster), 3 Bankr. 11, 13 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1979). Contra, Jones v. Wood (In Re Wood),
33 Bankr. 320 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1983)(the court may not use 105(a) to reinstitute the stay
after it lapses under § 362(e) or use § 105(a) to preclude such a lapse).
22. Section 362(f).
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have been made to give notice and the reasons why notice should
not be required. The party obtaining relief under this subsection
and § 362(f) shall immediately give oral notice thereof to the
trustee or debtor in possession and to the debtor and forthwith
mail or otherwise transmit to such person or persons a copy of the
order granting relief. On two days notice to the party who
obtained relief from the stay without notice or on shorter notice to
that party as the court may prescribe, the adverse party may
appear and move reinstatement of the stay. In that event, the
court shall proceed expeditiously to hear and determine the
motion.229
119.000 STIPULATION GRANTING RELIEF FROM THE AUTOMATIC STAY
The parties may stipulate to the granting of relief from the automatic
stay. Court approval of the stipulation is necessary as it is generally
required for all stipulations effecting a final settlement or compromise of
a dispute. 230 Such approval is granted on motion. 231 Prior to the granting
of such relief, twenty days notice of the proposed compromise or settle-
ment must be disseminated to the trustee, all creditors, all indenture
trustees and committees in accordance with Bankruptcy Rule 2002(a)(3)
unless the court for cause shown directs that notice not be sent.232 The
court may order that the notice of the proposed settlement only be sent to
the committees or their authorized agents and all parties who have
previously requested copies of all notices.233 When the court has approved
such a stipulation, the terms of that stipulation will be strictly enforced
in the event of default, and the court should not use its equity powers to
disregard that agreement. 234
In stipulating to a resolution of a dispute on stay litigation, the movant
often incorporates by reference in the document a debt repayment
schedule. The movant consents to forego his state debt collection reme-
dies so long as the debtor meets the payment schedule, but on the event
of default the agreement may provide that the stay is automatically
terminated without further action by the court. Alternatively, the
agreement could provide that the stay is modified immediately on
229 BANKR. R. 4001(c). See also, Gen. Elec. Credit Corp. v. Montgomery Mall Ltd.
Partnership (In Re Montgomery Mall Ltd. Partnership), 704 F.2d 1173 (10 Cir.)(relief under
§ 362(f) properly granted where the secured creditor "asserted that irreparable injury would
ensue unless expenses of the [debtor] were met and unless structural repairs [to improve-
ments to the realty] were undertaken").
230 BANKR. R. 9019.
231 Id.
232 BANKR. R. 2002(a)(3).
233 BANKR. R. 2002(i).
234 In Re Borchardt, 47 Bankr. 879, 881 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985).
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approval of the document by the judge, but that the creditor would not
utilize state collection remedies until the debtor's default in repayment.
Either of these methods obviates the need to return to court to obtain
relief from the stay on the debtor's default, and circumvents the
comcomitant delay of such recourse.
An oral stipulation made in open court is just as binding as one reduced
to writing.235
A stipulation settling a request for relief from the automatic stay
resolves the question of adequate protection even though the creditor
may have agreed to receive less protection than the law might otherwise
afford. 236
V. MISCELLANEOUS POINTS
20.000 INJUNCTIVE ACTION TO THWART THE BANKRUPTCY COURT'S AUTHORITY
TO DECIDE QUESTIONS ON RELIEF FROM THE STAY
As stated previously in this work, the bankruptcy court where the
bankruptcy petition is pending is generally the authority from which to
seek relief from the automatic stay.237 The only possible alternative is the
district court for the district in which the petition is pending, if the
reference of that aspect of the case has been withdrawn to that district
court.
2 3 8
In light of these constraints, it appears that a federal district court, and
similarly a state court, cannot enjoin a debtor from seeking a determi-
nation of the automatic stay from the bankruptcy court where his petition
is pending.239
21.000 PROPERTY RELEASED FROM THE STAY IS STILL PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE
When relief from the automatic stay is granted to a creditor as to an
item of property of the estate, that property is still property of the estate,
and the automatic stay continues to bar other creditors that are enjoined
235 Collateral Funding, Inc. v. Herrera (In Re Herrera), 23 Bankr. 796, 797 (Bankr. 9th
Cir. 1982).
2 Yahama Motor Corp. v. Shadco, Inc. 762 F.2d 668, 671 (8th Cir. 1985).
2 See Erti v. Paine Webber (In Re Baldwin-United Litigation), 765 F.2d 343 (2d Cir.
1985); Cathey v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 712 F.2d 60 (6th Cir. 1983).
238 Id.
239 See Erti at 343 (Where the debtor was a third party defendant in federal court in New
York although his reorganization case was pending in bankruptcy court in Ohio, the district
court in New York had the authority to determine whether the stay applied to the litigation
before it, but that court erred in granting the third party plaintiff an injunction barring the
debtor from seeking in bankruptcy court a declaration that a continuatin of the adversary
action was a violation of the automatic stay.)
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under § 362(a) from taking action against the property. 240 Thus, if a
senior encumbrance holder gets relief from the stay to foreclose his
security interest, a junior encumbrance holder in that same property is
not thereby freed from the prohibitions of § 362(a).241
22.000 COUNTERCLAIMS GENERALLY NOT HEARD WITH REQUEST FOR RELIEF
FROM THE AUTOMATIC STAY
A hearing on a request for relief from the automatic stay is normally
not the proper forum for hearing counterclaims.2 Such a hearing is
intended to be a summary proceeding set for expedited disposition; the
counterclaims should generally be heard later so as not to delay and
burden the disposition of the request for relief from the stay.243 Nonethe-
less, the court in its discretion may hear evidence on the existence of
counterclaims which it may consider in ruling on the request for relief
from the stay.244 Only those counterclaims which go to the essence of the
creditor's request for relief from the stay should be heard.245 The question
of counterclaims most often arises in cases in which a secured creditor
requests a modification of the stay in order to commence or continue
foreclosure proceedings against the collateral. Although the creditor, in
order to prevail, would typically need to establish the size of his debt; a
debt which might ultimately be reduced by setoff if the debtor is
successful on his counterclaim; that type of counterclaim generally would
not go to the essence of the request for relief.246 But if the debtor
challenged the validity of the recordation of the security interest, such a
matter would likely run to the essence of the creditor's case. A debtor's
counterclaims for the avoidance of liens, such as under § 522(f), would
likewise go to the essence of a request for relief from the automatic stay,
and thus those counterclaims could be heard with the request for relief
from the stay. 247 The following is an apt summary:
240 See In Re Saint Peter's School at 589 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983)(after a senior
encumbrance holder obtained relief from the stay and sold the subject property, the excess
proceeds of the sale were returned to the estate; a junior encumbrance holder could not
obtain the proceeds without relief from the stay nor could the debtor use the property
without court approval since it was cash collateral).
241 Id.
242 S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5841.
243 Id.
244 Id.
241 See Cent. Penn Natl. Bank v. Zimmerman (In Re Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co.), 35 Bankr.
703,705 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984); In Re Sunshine Books, Ltd., 41 Bankr. 712,715 n.2 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1984); Maryland Natl. Indus. Fin. Corp. v. Vacuum Cleaner Corp. of Am. (In Re
Vacuum Cleaner Corp. of Am.), 33 Bankr. 701, 705-06 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983).
246 In re Vacuum Cleaner 33 Bankr. at 705.
247 Id.
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Although defenses or counterclaims may be related or, to an
extent, be plausibly relevant to any determination of the amount
of the debt due if they are based upon allegations such as
misapplication or wrongful receipt of funds, breach of contract or
various miscellaneous alleged contractual duties, or fraud or false
representations, they are related or relevant only in the sense
that, if successfully maintained, they would ultimately effectuate
a reduction or set-off in the overall debt-credit relationship
between the parties. These types of matters and claims really do
not go to the validity and amount of the specific debt or lien
itself.248
23.000 CONFIRMATION BARRING RELIEF FROM THE STAY
As outlined above, the aspect of the stay afforded by § 362(a) which bars
acts against property of the estate terminates when the property is no
longer property of the estate.249 The remaining aspects of the stay
terminate at the earliest on the time of the closing of the case, the
dismissal of the case, or at the time of granting or denial of a discharge. 250
As to the first prong of § 362(c), title to property revests in the debtor on
the confirmation of a Chapter 11 or 13 plan unless the plan or the order
confirming the plan provides otherwise. 261 Thus, the prohibition of acts
against property of the estate as provided by § 362(a) would end on
confirmation if the property in question vested in the debtor, but this
aspect of the stay would still apply if the property did not so vest.2 5 2 In
spite of this, §§ 1141(a) and 1327(a) provide that in Chapter 11 and 13 the
confirmed plan binds the debtor and all creditors.
Furthermore, in a Chapter 11 case a discharge of debts is effected
immediately on the entry of the order of confirmation, such entry
typically being made prior to the debtor's full compliance with the plan
although in a chapter 13 case the discharge is entered only when all plan
payments have been made. 253 Thus, under chapter 11, the stay under §
362(a) of all acts other than acts against property of the estate would
terminate on confirmation. 254
... Maryland Nat'l Indus. Fin. Corp. v. Vacuum Cleaner Corp., 33 Bankr. 701, 705
(1983)(quoting United Companies Fin. Corp. v. Brantley, 6 Bankr. 178, 185 (Bankr. N.D.
Fla. 1980)).
141 Section 362(c)(1).
250 Section 362(c)(2).
251 11 U.S.C. §§ 1141(b) and 1327(b); seeMason v. Williams (InRe Mason), 45 Bankr. 498
(Bankr. D. Ore. 1984)(Chapter 13) affd, 51 Bankr. 548 (1985); In Re Lewis, 33 Bankr. 98
(Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 1983)(Chapter 13); In Re Paradise Valley Country Club, 31 Bankr. 613
(D. Colo. 1983) affg 26 Bankr. 990 (1983) (construing 11 U.S.C. § 1141(b), which is the
Chapter 11 analogue of § 1327(b)).
252 Section 362(c)(1).
253 Sections 1141(a)(d)(1) and 1328(a).
254 Section 362(c).
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Consequently, the confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan typically termi-
nates all aspects of the automatic stay. 255 Nonetheless, as stated above,
the confirmed plan binds both the debtor and creditors which effectively
replaces the protection afforded by the stay.
One line of authority holds that a confirmed plan, whether under
Chapter 11 or 13, binds the debtor and creditors and precludes the court
from granting relief from the automatic stay on grounds which were
present prior to the confirmation.256 Another line of authority holds that
a default in a confirmed plan releases a creditor from the constraints of
the plan, leaving him free to pursue debt collection efforts, including
foreclosure on encumbered property.257
24.000 FAILURE TO FILE A PROOF OF CLAIM BARRING SECURED CREDITOR
FROM OBTAINING RELIEF FROM THE STAY-AN ABERRANT LINE
OF CASES
A few aberrant cases have held that a secured creditor who fails to file
a timely proof of claim is barred from demanding adequate protection or
relief from the stay. See, e.g., Citizens and Southern National Bank v.
Rebuelta (In Re Rebuelta). 258 The cases rely on former Bankruptcy Rule
13-302(e)(1) which provided in part that, "[a]ny claim not properly filed
by the [secured] creditor [before the conclusion of the first meeting of
creditors] shall not be treated as a secured claim for purposes of voting
and distribution in the Chapter XIII case."25 9 The courts construed the
phrase "for purposes of voting and distribution" as including a request for
relief from the stay.260
The advisory committee notes to current Bankruptcy Rule 3002 indi-
cate that, "[a] secured claim need not be filed or allowed under § 502 or
§ 506(d) unless a party in interest has requested a determination and
allowance or disallowance under § 502. '261 This change would apparently
"overrule" cases such as Rebuelta.
255 In Re Ernst, 45 Bankr. 700 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985).
256 See In Re Evans, 30 Bankr. 530 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983) affd, 22 Bankr. 980 (1982);
Corn. of Pa. v. Flick (In Re Flick), 14 Bankr. 912 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981); In Re Clark, 38
Bankr. 683 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984)(collecting cases); Rhode Island Cent. Credit Union v.
Zimble (In Re Zimble), 47 Bankr. 639 (Bankr. D. R.I. 1985).
27 See In Re Ernst, 45 Bankr. 700 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985); Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp.
v. Fortner Oilfield Serv., Inc. (In Re Fortner Oilfield Serv., Inc.), 49 Bankr. 9 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 1984).
258 See, e.g., Citizens & S. Natl. Bank v. Rebuelta (In Re Rebuelta), 27 Bankr. 137
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1983).
259 id.
260 Id.
261 Id.
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25.000 THE FILING OF MULTIPLE PETITIONS TO THWART CREDITOR'S EFFORTS FOR
RELIEF FROM THE STAY
The filing of multiple petitions by debtors has been a continual source
of dismay to many creditors who seek relief from the automatic stay. This
is not surprising since the automatic stay is one of the primary benefits
of filing a petition in bankruptcy, and is frequently the only substantial
goal sought by a debtor.
The filing of multiple petitions arise under three different guises. The
first is the institution of subsequent bankruptcy proceedings after the
previous bankruptcy proceeding has been successfully terminated. In
such case under the earlier petition; any available assets have been
distributed to creditors through liquidation or under a repayment plan;
and a discharge, if allowable, has been granted or denied; and the case
closed. The second variant involves the filing of a subsequent petition
after the termination and closing of a previously aborted bankruptcy
proceeding. The last of the trilogy involves the filing of a later petition
during the pendency of proceedings on the former petition.
The question presented on the filing of a subsequent petition is whether
the later filing gives rise to the automatic stay. The language of § 362(a)
leads to the general proposition that the filing of a subsequent petition
gives rise to the stay. By its terms § 362(a) states: "(a) Except as provided
in [§ 362(b)], a petition filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this
title.., operates as a stay...." Thus, our springboard is the principle that
a validly filed petition gives rise to the stay.26 2 By implication, the filing
of a petition may not be valid.
Under the first situation, little problem is presented. After the success-
ful termination of one case, it seems that the debtor is free to file another
petition. A case is terminated when the clerk's office marks it "closed. '263
The Bankruptcy Code contains no express limitations on the filing of a
bankruptcy petition after the successful completion of any earlier pro-
ceeding. However, some mistakenly perceive the six year bar to the
discharge of debts in 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(8) and (A)(9) as a bar to the filing
of a petition. This is not so. A debtor may file a petition even though he
would not be entitled to a discharge.
On the second variety of multiple petitions listed above, the following
is a pertinent portion of § 109:
§ 109. Who may be a debtor
(f) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, no indi-
262 In Re Norris, 39 Bankr. 85, 87 (E.D Pa. 1984).
26 BANKR. R. 5009.
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vidual may be a debtor under this title who has been a debtor in
a case pending under this title at any time in the preceeding 180
days if-
(1) the case was dismissed by the court for willful failure of the
debtor to abide by orders of the court, or to appear before the court
in proper prosecution of the case; or
(2) the debtor requested and obtained the voluntary dismissal
of the case following the filing of a request for relief from the
automatic stay provided by section 362 of this title.264
This subsection was added to the Bankruptcy Code by the Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984. The initial question
under this provision is whether the filing of a petition in violation of §
109(f) is void ab initio so that the automatic stay is not implemented on
the filing of the petition. There is still a dearth of case law as of this
writing, but this seems a sounder view. The provision was apparently
passed by Congress to reduce debtors' latitude for abusing the bankruptcy
statute. As stated above, one of the primary goals of many debtors who
file multiple petitions is the protection of the automatic stay. Thus, it
seems that this construction is in accord with congressional intent. If this
view proves correct, no stay would arise notwithstanding the pendency of
the petition, and a creditor would be unconstrained by § 362(a). The
conclusion that a petition filed in violation of § 109(f) is void ab initio is
not the only rational determination a court may make, but this author
believes that it is the soundest of several.
An alternative view is that the filing of the petition in violation of §
109(f) nonetheless gives rise to the stay, at least until the bankruptcy
judge enters an order to dismiss the case. Such a dismissal would
typically be predicated on the filing of a motion for dismissal by the
trustee or a creditor. Prior to the entry of the dismissal, the debtor would
have obtained, at least in part, his objective of delaying creditors with the
automatic stay. This alternative suggests the issue of whether the
dismissal order automatically annuls the stay, or whether annulment
requires a court order under § 362(d) which expressly allows for such
relief. The point is pertinent since, as stated above, actions taken in
violation of the stay are void. Thus, for example, if the filing gives rise to
the stay and such stay is not annulled, an involuntary transfer of
property of the estate during the pendency of the case would be void, and
would theoretically cloud title to that property.
The above analysis presupposes that it is apparent that the debtor's
filing of a petition breaches § 109(f). An examination of the docket from
the prior proceeding(s) would usually reveal whether the debtor has filed
264 Section 109(0(2).
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in disregard of § 109(f)(2). Subsection 109(f)(2) merely requires that the
debtor requests and obtain dismissal after a creditor moves for relief from
the stay. The temporal sequence alone is pertinent. The language of the
statute does not require proof that the debtor intended to circumvent a
creditor's request for relief from the stay.
Although the presence of a bar to filing provided by § 109(f)(2) may
easily be gleaned from the docket, conclusions under § 109(f)(1) are not
always so simply made. Section 109(f)(1) apparently requires an actual
finding by the bankruptcy court that the case was dismissed due to the
debtor's willful dereliction or his failure to appear before the court in
proper prosecution of the case. The problem with § 109(f)(1) is illuminated
by a number of situations in which the court dismisses a case "for cause,"
although the "cause" need not be the debtor's willful failure to abide by
orders of the court or to appear before the court in proper prosecution of
the case. This dilemma presents a logistical problem for the courts in
deciding when the factual determination under § 109(f)(1) should be
made: at the termination of the earlier proceeding when that case is
dismissed; or at the commencement of the subsequent case on a party's
motion for dismissal based on § 109(f0(1). Holding it at the earlier
opportunity will be a waste of time if the debtor does not ultimately file
another petition within the 180 day period, But, holding the hearing only
after the filing of the later petition initially gives the later filing the
presumption of propriety, thus apparently giving rise to the automatic
stay. This consequently delays creditors' actions against the debtor until
a party can obtain a determination that the earlier dismissal was due to
the debtor's willful dereliction of lack of prosecution. If the court does not
have a set procedure established for when the hearing should be held, it
seems possible that a creditor may successfully request a hearing under
§ 109(f) either at the dismissal of the earlier case or the commencement
of the later one.
On the subject of our third variant of multiple filings, the lodging of a
second petition during the pendency of the first may be a nullity.265 "Over
the years, there has been a truism in bankruptcy circles that a debtor
cannot have two cases pending at the same time .... ,"266 The Bankruptcy
Code provides no express bar to the filing of successive petitions during
the administration under the first petition, although the pendency of
multiple petitions at the same time seems incongruous with the scheme
of the statute.
With a second petition filed during the administration of the first, the
265 Assoc. Fin. Serv. v. Cowen (In Re Cowen), 29 Bankr. 888, 894 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1983)(nullity).
266 In Re Tauscher, 26 Bankr. 99, 101 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1982)(the court ultimately held
that the filing of a Chapter 13 petition during the pendency of a Chapter 7 case was
allowable under the facts of that case).
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question again is whether the second filing gives rise to an automatic
stay. The point is pertinent because certain acts may no longer be barred
under the stay arising from the first petition-for instance, because the
entry of discharge under the first petition would terminate the stay as to
all acts other than acts against property of the estate, such acts could be
barred under the stay arising on the subsequent filing.267 It is possible
that a particular bankruptcy court may adopt as law the notion that the
second filing is void ab initio with no stay ever having arisen under that
spurious filing. This first choice is preferred by this author. The second of
several other options is that the court could hold that the filing of the
second petition is valid so long as it occurs after some significant cleavage
date in the administration of the case under the first petition. At least one
court has held that the filing of a second petition is valid so long as it is
filed after the entry of discharge under the first petition.268 A third
possibility is that the second filing is valid until dismissed by the court.
Any acts in derogation of the stay arising from the second petition would
be violative of the stay unless the particular creditor obtained an
annulment of the stay under § 362(d)(1). The case law has not yet
crystallized in this area.
26.000 RES JUDICATA ON RELIEF FROM THE AUTOMATIC STAY
The better reasoned view is that the doctrine of res judicata does not
apply to actions on relief from the stay, although in certain matters the
related doctrines of collateral estoppel and law of the case may apply.
The effects of res judicata on relief from the stay are best analyzed by
bifurcating the discussion into its effect within a single bankruptcy case
and its effect between different cases. Within a single case the granting
of relief from the stay would be presumptively determinative for the
remainder of the bankruptcy proceeding. If circumstances change to such
an extent that in retrospect the granting of relief from the automatic stay
appears highly improvident, the debtor could move for reconsideration or
relief either under Bankruptcy Rules 9023 and 9024, incorporating by
reference Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 and 60, or the doctrine of Wayne United Gas
Co, v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co.269 and Pfister v. Northern Illinois Finance
Corp.270 as applied in In Re Texlon Corp.271 Review of a decision on a
request for relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) made beyond the ten day
appeal period does not subject the underlying judgment to review on
appeal of a denial of relief under 60(b).
267 Section 362(c).
268 See In Re Tauscher, 26 Bankr. 99 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1982).
269 Wayne United Gas Co. v. Owens-Illinios Glass Co., 300 U.S. 131, 137-38 (1937).
270 Pfister v. N. Illinios Fin. Corp., 317 U.S. 144 (1942).
271 In Re Texion Corp., 596 F.2d 1092, 1100-02 (2d Cir. 1979).
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A denial of relief from the automatic stay would not bind a movant
under the principle of res judicata. The doctrine of res judicata is
customarily predicated on the use of a court hearing to prove that certain
historical facts existed which fit the mold of the cause of action at issue.
With a traditional cause of action, history has "frozen" the pertinent
facts. In an action for relief from the stay many of the pertinent facts
remain mutable. For instance, on a mortgagee's motion for relief from the
stay, both the value of the subject land and the size of the debt at issue
will change with the passage of time. Furthermore, relief from the stay is
peculiarly subject to numerous variables and equities in the case that are
typically subject to change. These variables include the debtor's potential
for reorganization, his continued ability to provide adequate protection,
and the arising of other "causes" warranting relief from the stay such as
a lapse of insurance coverage on encumbered property even though the
"cause" was not previously present. As stated in a recent case:
[T]he denial of relief from the stay is analogous to the continua-
tion of a preliminary injunction, see Foust v. Munson S.S. Lines,
299 U.S. 77 (1936), and therefore lacks the requisite finality for a
strong preclusive res judicata effect. Hamilton Watch Co. v.
Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738, 742 (2d Cir. 1953).272
Contrary authority ostensibly provides that res judicata is binding on
questions of relief from the stay. See, e.g., In Re BystrekY' 3 A closer
examination of cases such as Bystrek reveals that many of these cases
provide other bases for the decisions rather than res judicata. For
instance, in Bystrek the court granted the creditor's motion for relief from
the stay during the pendency of the debtor's first petition. After dismissal
of that petition the debtor filed another during the pendency of which the
creditor obtained a default judgment for relief from the stay. The court
denied the debtor's motion for reconsideration of the entry of the default
judgment finding that the second petition was filed in bad faith to defraud
the secured creditor, and that there were no changes in circumstances
underlying the merits of granting the motion for relief from the stay.
Furthermore, the continued vitality of Bystrek is in question as to the
proposition that relief from the stay is res judicata.274
The courts deciding cases in this area seem to be in search of an
emerging rule that-when a creditor has obtained relief from the stay
during the pendency of the first petition, at least in instances where the
creditor sought the relief to foreclose a lien--on the dismissal of the first
petition and the filing of a second one, the creditor filing for relief from
272 Johns-Manville Corp. v. Asbestos Litigation Group, 40 Bankr. 219, 228 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1984). See also, In Re Artishon, 39 Bankr. 890 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984).
273 In Re Bystrek, 17 Bankr. 894 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982).
274 In Re Norris, 39 Bankr. 85 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
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the stay under the second petition is presumptively entitled to that relief
unless the debtor or the trustee rebuts the presumption.27 5
27.000 PENALTIES FOR ABUSIVE FILINGS
The filing of frivolous or multiple petitions, an act often done to
implement the automatic stay and delay creditors, subjects the debtor
and his counsel to risk. As provided in part by Bankruptcy Rule 9011:
Rule 9011. Signing and Verification of Papers
(a) Signature. Every petition, pleading, motion and other paper
filed served in a case under the Code on behalf of a party
represented by an attorney, except a list, schedule, statement of
financial affairs, statement of executory contracts, Chapter 13
Statement, or amendments thereto, shall be signed by at least
one attorney of record in his individual name, whose office
address and telephone number shall be stated. A party who is not
represented by an attorney shall sign all papers and state his
address and telephone number. The signature of an attorney or a
party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the
document; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and
belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact
and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; and that it is
not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass, to
cause delay, or to increase the cost of litigation. If a document is
not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after
the omission is called to the attention of the person whose
signature is required. If a document is signed in violation of this
rule, the court on motion or on its own initiative, shall impose on
the person who signed it, the represented party, or both, an
appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the
other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred because of the filing of the document, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.2 7 6
The rule, of course, is a modification of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. Inter alia, the
debtor or his counsel is subject to liability under the rule. Under this
provision debtors' counsel have been assessed attorneys' fees in favor of
opposing counsel for costs incurred by opposing counsel in obtaining relief
275 See, e.g., Bystrek, 17 Bankr. 894;Artishon, 39 Bankr. 890 (although a secured creditor
obtained relief from the stay against the debtor in a prior bankruptcy case, the debtor's
changed circumstances precluded a finding of "cause" under § 362(d)(1) in the case under
scrutiny).
.76 BANKR. R. 9011(a).
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from the automatic stay from second and subsequent petitions which
have been filed in bad faith.2 77
Relief for the abusive filing of petitions may also be predicated on 28
U.S.C. § 1927:
§ 1927. Counsel's liability for excessive costs
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any
court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so
multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexa-
tiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the
excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred
because of such conduct.27 8
Note that § 1927 generally only applies against attorneys and not
litigants.
Litigants may be assessed costs under the court's inherent power to
protect the orderly administration ofjustice, and to maintain the author-
ity and dignity of the court.279 Under the court's inherent power,
sanctions may be predicated on conduct which, "constitutes or was
tantamount to bad faith," although under § 1927 relief must be predi-
cated on "reckless or actual bad faith conduct." 280
Exceptions to the "American Rule" for awarding attorneys' fees may
also be a possibility. 28 '
28.000 ATTORNEYS' FEES FOR PURSUING MODIFICATION OF THE STAY
The following is the "American Rule" for awarding attorneys' fees: "In
the United States, the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to
collect a reasonable attorneys' fee from the loser.128 2 Furthermore:
Summarizing the law. . . "[i]t is a well-settled general principle
that an attorney must look to his own client alone for payment for
his services, and this principle is applicable in bankruptcy
matters as well as in others ... ." 6 Remington on Bankruptcy
2665 (5th ed. 1952). Nonetheless, an attorney may be compen-
277 See In Re Perez, 43 Bankr. 530, 534 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1984); In Re Ligon, 50 Bankr.
127, (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1985).
278 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1986). See, e.g., Sundstrom Mortgage Co., Inc. v. 2218 Bluebird Ltd.
Partnership (In Re 2218 Bluebird Ltd. Partnership), 41 Bankr. 540, 544 (Bankr. S.D. Cal.
1984)(on assessment against debtor's counsel under § 1927).
279 In Re Bluebird at 544.
211 See Id.; See also U.S. v. Blodgett, 709 F.2d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1983).
21 See cases collected in Lyco Truck Sales and Serv., Inc. v. Hopkins (In Re Lyco Truck
Sales and Service, Inc.), 20 Bankr. 408 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1982).
282 Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975); Perichak v.
Int'l. Union of Elec. Radio and Mach. Workers, 715 F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1983).
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sated from the bankruptcy estate where the Code expressly or by
clear implication authorizes allowance out of that estate. Id.
Happily for bankruptcy lawyers the Code expressly allows for the
award of attorneys' fee when there is an order appointing them.
See eg., 11 U.S.C. §§ 327, 330, 1103.283
Exceptions to the American Rule may be found summarized in Lyco
Truck Sales and Service, Inc. v. Hopkins (In Re Lyco Truck Sales and
Service, Inc.).284
In accordance with the "American Rule," a party who moves for relief
from the stay is generally not entitled to attorneys' fees from the debtor
or the estate. An exception to this rule is expressly provided for a creditor
holding a security interest in property of the estate where the agreement
creating that security interest provides that the creditor is entitled to
attorneys' fees.28 5 The exception is limited to situations where the equity
cushion in the collateral protecting that creditor is adequate to allow the
attachment of those fees to the property.
On a related front, one case has held that where the debtors prevailed
on a creditor's motion for relief from the stay to foreclose on a deed of
trust, the debtors were not entitled to attorneys, fees notwithstanding a
clause in the document creating the deed of trust allowing the creditor
attorneys' fees as well as California state statute allowing such fees "in
an action on a contract" if the contract allows the opposing party
attorneys' fees. 28 6 The court stated that "the state law governing contrac-
tual relationships is not considered in stay litigation."287 Although the
court's apparent basis for the decision-that the contractual relationship
is not considered in stay litigation-is arguably erroneous, the result is
based on policy considerations, but, of course, it is nonetheless binding
under that state statute in that circuit. An identical result based on a
construction of the California statute would have provided a more tenable
basis for the holding.
29.000 INJUNCTIONS UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE OTHER THAN
THOSE ARISING UNDER SECTION 362(A)
As discussed above, 11 U.S.C. § 1301 bars actions against those who are
liable with the debtor on certain obligations if the debtor is proceeding in
a Chapter 13 case.
One of the primary sources of injunctive power under the Bankruptcy
Code is found at 11 U.S.C. § 105(a): "(a) The court may issue any order,
283 In Re Fidelity Am. Fin. Corp., 48 Bankr. 258, 260 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985).
284 See In Re Lyco at 408.
285 Section 506(b).
286 Johnson v. Righetti (In Re Johnson), 756 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1985).
287 Id. at 740.
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process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the
provisions of this title."288
The termination or modification of utility service is circumscribed by
11 U.S.C. § 366:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a utility
may not alter, refuse, or discontinue service to, or discriminate
against, the trustee or the debtor solely on the basis of the
commencement of a case under this title or that a debt owed by
the debtor to such utility for service rendered before the order for
relief was not paid when due.
(b) Such utility may alter, refuse, or discontinue service if
neither the trustee nor the debtor, within 20 days after the date
of the order for relief, furnishes adequate assurance of payment,
in the form of a deposit or other security, for service after such
date. On request of a party in interest and after notice and a
hearing, the court may order reasonable modification of the
amount of the deposit or other security necessary to provide
adequate assurance of payment.2 9
Section 366(a) bars a utility from discriminating against a debtor or the
trustee, or altering, refusing, or discontinuing service solely because the
debtor filed for bankruptcy or has not paid for prepetition utility service.
The utility may modify or terminate service if the debtor or the trustee
does not provide a security deposit or other assurance that the debtor will
pay for postpetition utility service.290 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit has held that if the debtor defaults in his postpeti-
tion utility payments, the utility may commence termination proceedings
under nonbankruptcy law.291 Such nonbankruptcy laws, such as the
regulations of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, are not
preempted by § 366.292
Under 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) the entry of discharge gives rise to an
injunction against all attempts to collect on discharged debts. Section
524(a)(3) similarly provides that, subject to exceptions, the entry of
discharge enjoins creditor action on prepetition community claims
against the debtor's interest in community property that was acquired
after the filing of the bankruptcy petition.
Property exempted by the debtor is protected from creditor action to a
limited extent under 11 U.S.C. § 522(c):
288 Section 105(a).
289 Section 366.
290 Id.
291 Begley v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 760 F.2d 46 (3d Cir. 1985).
292 Id.
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(c) Unless the case is dismissed, property exempted under this
section is not liable during or after the case for any debt of the
debtor that arose, or that is determined under section 502 of
this title as if such debt had arisen, before the commencement of
the case, except-
(1) a debt of a kind specified in section 523(a)(1) or 523(a)(5) of
this title; or
(2) a debt secured by a lien that is-
(A)(i) not avoided under subsection (f) or (g) of this section or
under section 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, or 724(a) of this title; and
(ii) not void under section 506(d) of this title; or
(B) a tax lien, notice of which is properly filed.293
This section provides that even a nondischargable debt may not be
satisfied by exempt property unless the debt is for taxes, alimony,
maintenance, or child support or is a debt secured by an unavoided lien.
The Bankruptcy Code likewise enjoins certain kinds of discriminatory
treatment:
§ 525. Protection against discriminatory treatment.
(a) Except as provided in the Perishable Agricultural Commod-
ities Act, 1930 (7 U.S.C.§§ 499a - 499s), the Packers and Stock-
yards Act, 1921 (7 U.S.C. §§ 181 - 229), and section 1 of the Act
entitled, "An Act making appropriations for the Department of
Agriculture for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1944, and for other
purposes," approved July 12, 1943, (57 Stat. 422; 7 U.S.C. § 204),
a government unit may not deny, revoke, suspend, or refuse to
renew a licence, permit, charter, franchise, or other similar grant
to, condition such a grant to, discriminate with respect to such a
grant against, deny employment to, terminate the employment
of, or discriminate with respect to employment against, a person
that is or has been a debtor under this title or a bankrupt or a
debtor under the Bankruptcy Act, or another person with whom
such bankrupt or debtor is or has been a debtor under this title or
a bankrupt or a debtor under the Bankruptcy Act, has been
insolvent before the commencement of the case under this title, or
during the case but before the debtor is granted or denied a
discharge, or has not paid a debt that is dischargable in the case
under this title or that was discharged under the Bankruptcy
Act.294
The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 ex-
tended the protection of § 525 with the following language:
293 Section 522(c).
294 Section 525(a).
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(b) No private employer may terminate the employment of, or
discriminate with respect to employment, an individual who is or
has been a debtor under this title, a debtor or bankrupt under the
Bankruptcy Act, or an individual associated with such debtor or
bankrupt, solely because such debtor or bankrupt-
(1) is or had been a debtor under this title or a debtor under
the Bankruptcy Act;
(2) has been insolvent before the commencement of a case
under this title or during the case but before the grant or denial
of a discharge; or
(3) has not paid a debt that is dischargeable in a case under
this title or that was discharged under the Bankruptcy Act. 295
30.000 APPEAL FROM AN ORDER GRANTING OR DENYING RELIEF FROM THE
AUTOMATIC STAY
Final orders of the bankruptcy court are appealable to the district court
or, if applicable, to the bankruptcy appellate panel.29 6 An order granting
relief from the automatic stay is not final in that it does not end all
judicial proceedings as to the bankruptcy under consideration, 297 yet the
weight of authority holds that the order is sufficiently separate from the
bankruptcy so as to afford appeal as a matter of right under exceptions to
the finality doctrine. 298
In a related area, several defendants in a civil action who unsuccess-
fully sought a stay of a civil action pending the resolution of the
bankruptcy proceedings of several other defendants, could not appeal the
denial of the stay as a matter of right. 299
30.100 Procedure for Appeal
The Bankruptcy Rules govern the appellate process from the bank-
ruptcy court to the district court or the bankruptcy appellate panel. As
with all other final orders of the bankruptcy court, a notice of appeal must
295 Section 525(b).
296 28 U.S.C. § 158 (Supp III 1985).
297 Section 362.
298 Crocker Nat. Bank v. Am. Mariner Inc., 734 F.2d 426, 429 (9th Cir. 1984)(order
granting or denying relief from the automatic stay is appealable as a matter of right);
Moxley v. Comer, 716 F.2d 168 (3d Cir. 1983)(same); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Leimer, 724 F.2d
744 (8th Cir. 1984)(same); Growth Realty Co. v. Regency Woods Apartments, 686 F.2d 899,
902 (11th Cir. 1982)(same); Sec. Investor Protection Corp. v. Christian-Paine & Co., Inc.,
755 F.2d 359, 360 (3d Cir. 1985)(appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals from
bankruptcy courts); In Re Amatex, 755 F.2d 1034 (3d Cir. 1985)(finality requirement for
appellate jurisdiction is broadly construed).
299 Evilsizor v. Eagle-Picher Inc., 725 F.2d 97 (10th Cir. 1984); Gold v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 723 F.2d 1068 (3d Cir. 1983)(same)(also contains excellent review of interloc-
utory review, mandamus and prohibition).
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be filed with the clerk of the bankruptcy court within ten days after the
court's order is docketed, 300 as opposed to the longer thirty day period that
applies in appealing from final orders of the district court. 30 1 Within ten
days after the entry of the order, a party may move for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, for the amendment or finding of additional
facts, alteration or amendment of the judgment, or for a new trial. These
motions toll the running of the appeal period.30 2
Within ten days after the filing of a notice of appeal the appellant must
file with the clerk of the bankruptcy court a designation of the items to be
included in the record on appeal, and a statement of the issues to be
presented.303 Within seven days after the service of the appellant's
statement, the appellee may file and serve on the appellant a designation
of additional items to be included in the record on appeal, and if the
appellee has filed a cross appeal, the appellee as cross appellant, shall file
and serve a statement of the issues to be presented on the cross appeal, as
well as a designation of additional items to be included in the record.
304
A cross appellee may within seven days of service of the cross appellant's
designation, file and serve on the cross appellant a designation of
additional items to be included in the record.3 05 The appellate record shall
include the items designated by the parties as well as the notice of appeal,
the judgment from which the appeal lies, and any opinion, findings of act,
and conclusions of law of the bankruptcy court.30 6 If the record includes
a transcript, the party designating the transcript shall immediately
deliver to the report and file with the clerk of the bankruptcy court a
written request for it, and make satisfactory arrangements to secure
payment of it.307 When the record is complete the clerk of the bankruptcy
court transmits it to the clerk of the appropriate appellate court.30
Papers to be filed with the appellate courts shall be filed with the clerk
of the appropriate court-either the clerk of the district court or the clerk
of the bankruptcy appellate panel-but filing of a paper is not complete
until it is received by that clerk. 309 Nonetheless, briefs are deemed filed
on the day of mailing.310 Unless local rule of court or court order directs
otherwise, the appellant shall file and serve his brief within fifteen days
300 FED. R. APP. P. 4.
301 BANKR. R. 8002.
3U2 BaiK. R. 8002(b).
303 BANKR. R. 8006.
304 Id.
305 Id.
306 Id.
307 Id.
308 BANKR. R. 8007(b).
309 BANKR. R. 8008(a).
310 Id.
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after the entry of the appeal on the appellate court docket.311 The appellee
must serve and file his brief within fifteen days after service of the
appellant's brief, and if the appellee has cross appealed, he should therein
brief the merits of his cross appeal although the issues and arguments on
the appeal, and the cross appeal should be separately denominated as
such.3' 2 The appellant may file a reply brief within ten days after service
of the appellee's brief, and if the appellee has cross appealed, the appellee
may file and serve a reply brief to the appellant's response to the issues
presented in the cross appeal within ten days after service of the reply
brief.3' 3 If the appeal is to a bankruptcy appellate panel, the appellant
shall serve and file with his brief an appendix containing all pertinent
documents and docket entries. 314 Oral arguments will thereafter be
scheduled unless the district judge or the judges of the bankruptcy
appellate panel unanimously determine after examination of the briefs
that oral argument is not necessary. 315 Any party may submit a state-
ment setting forth the reasons why oral argument should be granted.
Upon rendition of a final decision by the district court or the bankruptcy
appellate panel, an aggrieved party may file a notice of appeal within
thirty days to the United States Court of Appeals. The Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure will then govern.
30.200 Need and Method of Seeking a Stay Pending Appeal
or an Order Granting or Denying Relief from the Automatic Stay
A motion to stay an order granting relief from the automatic stay may
be sought from the bankruptcy judge or thereafter from the district or the
bankruptcy appellate panel.316 Such relief may be conditioned on the
filing of a supersedeas bond.317 An unstayed order modifying the auto-
matic stay thus permitting an action such as foreclosure to occur becomes
moot, and the appeal may be dismissed even though all relevant entities
are parties to the appeal.3 18
The grounds for seeking such a stay are recapitulated as follows:
1. A likelihood that the parties seeking the stay will prevail on
the merits of the appeal;
2. The movants will suffer irreparable injury unless the stay is
granted;
... BANKR. R. 8009(a).
312 !d.
313 Id.
314 BANKR. R. 8009(b).
31" BANKR. R. 8012.
3" BANKR. R. 8005.
317 Id.
318 See In Re Sewanee Land, Coal & Cattle, Inc. 735 F.2d 1294 (1 lth Cir. 1984); Algeron,
Inc. v. Advance Ross Corp., 759 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1985).
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3. Other parties will suffer no substantial harm if the stay is
granted; [and]
4. The public interest will not be harmed if the stay is granted.
319
30.300 Scope of Review of Orders on Appeal of Order Granting Relief
From the Stay
Some courts have held that a conclusion on the presence of "cause"
under § 362(d)(1) is within the discretion of the bankruptcy court, and
may be reviewed only for an abuse of discretion.320
Bankruptcy Rule 8013 provides that on appellate review, a bankruptcy
judge's "[findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous,
and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the bankruptcy court
to judge the credibility of the witness."321 The case law indicates that
appellate review of a bankruptcy judge's conclusions of law is plenary.322
When a finding of fact is predicated on an improper legal standard, or a
proper one improperly applied, that factual finding "loses the insulation
of the clearly erroneous rule."323
319 In Re Baldwin United Corp., 45 Bankr. 385, 386 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984).
320 See In Re MacDonald, 755 F.2d 715, 716 (9th Cir. 1985); Holtkamp v. Littlefield (In
Re Holtkamp), 669 F.2d 505, 507 (7th Cir. 1982); In Re Frigidtemp Corp., 8 Bankr. 284, 289
(S.D. N.Y. 1981)(decided under BANKR. R. 401 which contained the precursor of the "for
cause" basis for granting relief from stay under § 362(d)(1)); In Re Curtis, 40 Bankr. 795,
799 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984).
21 Carlisle Cashway, Inc. v. Johnson (In Re Johnson), 691 F.2d 249 (6th Cir. 1982).
.2 Wilson v. Juffman (In Re Missionary Baptist Found. of American, Inc.), 712 F.2d 206
(5th Cir. 1983); See also Johnson, 691 F.2d at 249.
123 See In Re Missionary Baptist Found., 712 F.2d at 209.
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